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OPINION AND RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE IN
WORKPLACE DEFAMATION ACTIONS:
THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR
MEANINGFUL STANDARDS
John Bruce Lewis*
Gregory V. Mersol**
INTRODUCTION
The workplace is a microcosm of society, with employers, employ-
ees, and union representatives having their say on subjects ranging
from purely individual concerns to economic, business, and political
issues. The tenor of these statements may be straightforward and bus-
inesslike, or strident, profane, and charged with emotion. They may
involve a white-collar worker's e-mail accusing a company official of
engaging in fraudulent accounting practices, a striking union mem-
ber's reflexive intonation of "scab" when a replacement worker
crosses the picket line, or management's warning that a labor organi-
zation is using "blackmail tactics."
The individuals involved likely would describe many of these com-
munications as "opinions"-opinions on pay rates, the level of an em-
ployee's performance, or the honesty of corporate management.
Indeed, many participants in workplace discourse fail to recognize
such statements of "opinion" are not fully protected by the United
States Constitution or by the growing number of federal labor and
employment laws.
While permitting robust debate during organizational campaigns
and strikes, federal labor laws provide no absolute protection for
workplace speech. The labor laws, to a great extent, leave the regula-
tion of employment-related speech to the common law.' Statements
* Partner. Baker & Hostetler. LLP Cleveland, Ohio, B.A., J.D. University of Missouri:
LL.M. Columbia University.
** Partner, Baker & Hostetler. LLP Cleveland. Ohio. B.A.. J.D. Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity. The authors wish to thank Joseph D. King and Carl E. Black for their assistance during
the preparation of this article, and Louis A. Colombo for his helpful comments on the
manuscript.
1. See The Railway Labor Act (RLA). 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2002): The National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA). 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2002). See also infra notes 161-175 (discussing the relation-
ship between federal labor and state defamation law).
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routinely made by employers in performance appraisals likewise re-
ceive no special protection under federal labor or employment laws
and are consequently governed by common law principles. 2 Hence,
the sometimes heavy hand of state defamation law chooses, on an ad
hoc basis, which speech is legitimate and which is to be penalized-
which should be expressed and which should be stifled by damage
awards.
The impact of the common law of defamation on opinion and hy-
perbolic expression was, until 1990, mitigated in two ways. The first
was through federal labor law and policy, which provided protection
for rhetorical hyperbole in certain workplace situations.3 The federal
Constitution was also thought to provide a second form of protection
for hyperbole and opinions, independent of workplace connection or
federal labor law. 4
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided Milkovich v. Lo-
rain Journal Co.,5 which held there was no "wholesale defamation ex-
emption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.'"6 While other
protections for free expression remained in place, Milkovich raised
serious questions regarding the protection of opinions in workplace
situations and protection in general for statements not involving me-
dia publications.
These workplace opinions, both written and oral, deserve special
attention because of their unique background and importance to busi-
ness, labor, and society. Case law protecting opinion developed in the
1960s and 1970s, in part, from work-related disputes. Many workplace
communications, such as those regarding employee discipline or
unionization, are hastily made by relatively unsophisticated individu-
als without the benefit of legal counsel or the prepublication review
sometimes performed by the media. Yet, the nature of the workplace
dictates that these communications be made and the authors be given
simple, straightforward guidance as to their legality. The use of e-
mail, the Internet, and other electronic vehicles for work-related
speech only heightens this need.
This Article examines the impact of Milkovich on tests previously
used by lower courts to safeguard the expression of opinion and hy-
perbolic speech. This Article also considers whether the search for
2. See John B. Lewis et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals
for Reform, 54 Mo. L. REV. 797. 830-35 (1989): see also infra notes 7-13.
3. See infra notes 161-175 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 63-109 and accompanying text.
5. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
6. Id. at 18.
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expressed and implied facts in communications suggested in Milkovich
forecloses analysis of the content, setting, and immediate context of
the "opinion," thus leading to the finding of more implied factual
statements. The utility of the decision is further questioned, since it
recognizes protection for rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, and
lusty expression, but fails to expressly provide for the more rational
discourse found in employment-related debates.
Based upon this analysis, this Article concludes that while the
Milkovich decision has done little harm, it has failed to provide clear,
workable tests for identifying statements of opinion or rhetorical hy-
perbole in the workplace. Instead, the legality of routine workplace
speech may turn upon a patchwork of tests and elements fashioned in
other contexts. Left with no clear guidance, courts continue to strug-
gle in their attempts to distinguish between protected workplace ex-
pression and actionable defamation. This Article concludes with a
proposed set of common law and statutory reforms to protect the vital
role of opinions in the workplace.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF DEFAMATION AND THE
OPINION DEFENSE
A. Basic Elements of a Defamation Claim
A claim of defamation arising out of the employment relationship
must meet the same common law standards imposed on any other
type of defamation claim. To establish a claim for defamation, the
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) a publication to a third party;
(2) of a false and defamatory 7 statement about him; (3) "fault
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher;",, and (4)
either that the statement is actionable irrespective of special harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 9 Defenses
7. A statement is defamatory if "it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
8. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 558 (emphasis added). This fault requirement is based on
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff must show
actual malice to get punitive damages), however. raises questions about this position. Many
commentators believe the Gertz fault requirement is diluted when the defamatory statement
does not involve a matter of public concern. See FOWLER V. HARPER El AL.. THE LAW OF
TORTS § 5.0 at 20-22 (3d ed. 1996).
9. The Restatement provides:
Actual harm to reputation is not necessary to make communication defamatory. To be
defamatory, it is not necessary that the communication actually cause harm to another's
reputation or deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Its character
depends upon its general tendency to have such an effect. In a particular case it may
20021
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available to the defendant include: the truth of the statement;10 the
plaintiff's consent to the statement;'1 fair comment; 12 the expression
of pure opinion; and the existence of an absolute, conditional, or qual-
ified privilege. 3 This article will focus on the doctrine of opinion,
which may or may not be a defense, and on protection for rhetorical
hyperbole, which does not fall neatly within any category.
B. The Common Law Position on Abusive Words,
Name-Calling and Hyperbole
1. Development of the English Common Law Position
The law of defamation developed from English ecclesiastical ori-
gins,14 with early decisions taking no definitive position on whether
abusive words, name-calling, and hyperbole were actionable.1 5 Some
not do so either because the other's reputation is so hopelessly bad or so unassailable
that no words can affect it harmfully, or because of the lack of credibility of the de-
famer. There is a difference in this respect between determining whether a communi-
cation is defamatory and determining whether damages can be recovered.
RESTATEMENT. supra note 7. at § 559 cmt. d. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 111 (5th ed. 1984).
10. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 581A (stating that "[o]ne who publishes a defama-
tory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true."). Follow-
ing the decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986). the
plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of falsity on matters of public concern.
11. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 583 (stating that a person's consent to the "publica-
tion of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation.").
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 (stating that "[a] defamatory communication
may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable
only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.").
This section superseded the "fair comment" protection previously provided by Sections 606
through 610 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), since "[a] statement of opinion
that does not imply a defamatory statement of fact is no longer actionable . . . no privilege is
needed." See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7. at §§ 606-610.
13. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at §§ 585-592A (stating that an absolute privilege exists
based on the "necessity that certain persons, because of their special position or status, should be
as free as possible from fear that their actions in that position might have an adverse effect upon
their own personal interests."). The privilege extends to judicial officers, attorneys at law, par-
ties to judicial proceedings, witnesses in judicial proceedings, jurors, legislators, witnesses in leg-
islative proceedings, executive and administrative officers, husband and wife, and publications
required by law. Id. See also Sahara Gaming Corp. v. Culinary Workers Union Local 226. 984
P.2d 164 (Nev. 1999) (holding that a union letter quoting portion of complaint in legal action is
absolutely privileged).
14. For a description of the origins of the law of defamation in England. see 101 R. H.
HEMHOLZ. SELECr CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600 xiv-cxi (Selden Society, 1985); J. H. BAKER,
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 495-508 (3d ed. 1990): R. H. Hemholz. Canonical
Defamation In Medieval England, 15 AM. J. LEGAi HIST. 255 (1971); W. S. Holdsworth, Defa-
mation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. 40 LAW Q. REV. 397, 397-412 (1924): R.C.
Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 99, 99-126.
15. See HELMHOLZ. supra note 14, at xcv-xcvi.
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clearly abusive words were found actionable, while others were not. t6
By the mid-seventeenth century, however, two treatises found that
abusive, passionate words were not actionable unless special damages
were established. 17
William Sheppard's Action on the Case for Slander, published in
1662, declared:
The words that follow are light and trivial or hasty and passionate
words; and therefore . . . they give no Action as for any of these
words, Villein, Rogue, Knave, Bastard, Varlet, Cheater, Cozener,
Railer, Liar, Miscreant, Vermine, Hypocrite, and the like; except...
where some special damage comes thereby to the party of whom the
words are spoken. And it must be a real and considerable
damage.18
This appears to have been the state of the English common law at the
time it was received into the United States. 19 The exact basis for the
law's position is unclear, but it may have been adopted to stem the
flow of slander cases into the royal courts, to avoid providing relief for
trivial, commonplace injuries, 20 or because these cases did not fit
within the established categories of actionable slander. 21
2. The American Experience
The rational development of American law on abusive words was
further complicated by the distinction between slander and libel,
16. See HELMHOLZ, supra note 14. at xcv-xcvi, 89 (contrasting Hooper v. Webbe (K.B. 1559)
(describing that the statement "[t]hou art a knave and a villein" results in a verdict for the
plaintiff) with Burr v. Chappell (K.B. 1595) (holding that an action based on "villein" found "not
maintainable, because these are common and usual words of reproach by master to servant.")).
17. See JOHN MARCH, AC'I iONS FOR SLANDER (1655): WILLIAM SHEPPARD, ACI-ION ON THF
CASE FOR SLANDER (1662).
18. SHEPPARD, supra note 17, at 74. In his 1655 treatise. John March reached a similar
conclusion:
There are many words which [are] words of passion, and choller only. [and] say of a
man, that he is forsworn generally, or that he is a villain, or a rogue or a varlet. or the
like. these words are not actionable of themselves: yet I do conceive that in these cases
an action will lie, with an averment of particular damage. by reason of the speaking of
them.
MARCH, supra note 17. at 98.
19. See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 30-33 (1981): An-
drew J. King, The Law Of Slander in Early Antebellum America. 35 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 1. 6 n.18
(1991).
20. See HELMHOLZ. supra note 14. at xcvi. Today in England a "vulgar abuse" defense is
available in actions for slander. "The usual form of the plea is that 'the words were words of
heat or vulgar abuse and were so understood by those to whom they were published.'"- PETER F.
CARTER-RUCK ET AL.. CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 162 (4th ed. 1992).
21. See King. supra note 19. at 4: W. HOLDSWORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH L AW 335-47
(1925).
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which also originated in England.2 2 The English courts recognized sit-
uations in which damages could be presumed from the character of
the words spoken. In those situations, the statement was said to be
slander per se.23 Words were actionable per se if they: (1) imputed the
commission of a crime; (2) imputed a loathsome disease; (3) imputed
an unfitness for a profession, trade, or calling; or (4) imputed the lack
of chastity of a woman. 24 If a statement did not fall into one of these
categories, the plaintiff was required to plead and prove special harm
resulting from the defamatory statement.25
Libel, consisting of written or printed words, was treated differ-
ently. A libel plaintiff could recover without the necessity of pleading
or proving special damages because such damages were presumed. 26
In the 1838 case of Rice v. Simmons,27 the Delaware Court of Errors
and Appeals considered this libel/slander distinction in the context of
whether abusive words were actionable. In its analysis, the court ac-
knowledged, "[w]ords of general abuse, however opprobrious, and
however vexatious," were not actionable as slander unless they fit
22. See BAKER, supra note 14. at 506-08. The categories essentially had been developed by
the time of March's treatise in 1655. See MARCH. supra note 17. at 10-11. See also Donnelly,
supra note 14. at 111-13: Holdsworth. supra note 14. at 397-400.
23. See BAKER, supra note 14. at 507: RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 7:1-7:20 at
7-2.1-7-16 (2d ed. 2001).
24. See BAKER, supra note 14. at 507: Holdsworth, supra note 14, at 398: Donnelly. supra note
14. at 111-12. According to the Restatement. there are four categories of slander per se for
which a person will be liable for general damages without proof of special harm: an imputation
of a serious crime involving moral turpitude: an imputation of a loathsome disease: an imputa-
tion of inability to perform or lack of integrity in the discharge of the duties of a business, trade.
profession or office: or an imputation of serious sexual misconduct. RESTATEMENT. supra note
7, at §§ 571-74.
25. See Holdsworth, supra note 14, at 401-02: SMOLLA. supra note 23, at § 7:1. § 7-2.1.
26. See Donnelly, supra note 14, at 12(1-21 (citing King v. Sir Edward Lake (1670) Hardres,
470). See also RESTATEMENT. supra note 7. at §§ 568-69 (1977). The Restatement defines slan-
der and libel as follows:
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words.
by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication that
has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words. transi-
tory gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in Subsec-
tion (1).
(3) The area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its publica-
tion and the persistence of the defamation are factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether a publication is a libel rather than a slander.
Id.
27. 2 Del. 417 (1838). The court also commented that "to call a man 'forsworn:' or a 'scoun-
drel:' or a 'cheat:' or a 'rogue:' or a 'rascal:' or a *swindler:' have been considered not actionable.
because the words do not necessarily import punishable crimes." ld. at 424.
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within one of the per se categories or actually caused "special dam-
age."'28 Should libel be treated differently? The court thought not:
[Miere general abuse and scurrility, however ill-natured and vexa-
tious, is no more actionable when written than spoken, if it do [sic]
not convey a degrading charge or imputation. Against all such at-
tacks, a man needs no other protection than a good character; and
the law will not suppose that damage can happen to such a charac-
ter from the pointless arrows of mere vulgarity. 29
Likewise, in Moseley v. Moss, 30 the Virginia Court of Appeals ex-
amined whether abusive words were actionable in the slander con-
text.3 ' After reviewing the categories that made words actionable
without proof of damages, the court concluded at common law that
abusive words were not "sufficiently substantial" to merit damages: 32
"Words spoken that are merely vituperative, or insulting, or imputing
only disorderly or immoral conduct, or ignoble habits, propensities or
inclinations, or the want of delicacy, refinement or good breeding, are
not ... to be treated as injuries calling for redress in damages. '33
Almost one hundred years later, the Ohio Supreme Court found the
law on abusive words well-settled, declaring: "[I]t is axiomatic that
opprobrious epithets, even if malicious, profane and in public, are or-
dinarily not actionable. There is no right to recover for bad
manners.,
34
One modern commentator has suggested several bases for the
American rule that abusive words, name-calling, and hyperbole were
not actionable:
[I]f it is clear to the listener or reader that such language is no more
than either an idle comment or the venting of the speaker's or
writer's emotions and therefore does not reflect adversely on the
plaintiff's reputation; that epithets ... may be merely a form of non-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). In Robbins v. Treadway & Co., 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh.) 540, 541
(1829). the court declared: "[Tihe publication, charged to be libellous. contains many opprobri-
ous epithets: but these are not libellous.-
30. 47 Va. (6 Gratt) 534 (1850).
31. Id. at 538.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court of appeals listed types and categories of words for which an action would
not lie:
[Ilt is not actionable to call a man a villain, cheat, rascal, liar, coward or ruffian: to
accuse him of swearing falsely, unless in a judicial proceeding: to charge him with a
base or fraudulent act, or with having been guilty of adultery, seduction, or debauchery;
or a woman with vulgarity, obscenity or incontinence; where such defamation bears
only on the feelings or general standing or reputation of the party implicated, and the
misconduct imputed has not been made punishable by statute.
Id.
34. Bartow v. Smith. 78 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio 1948).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:19
actionable opinion; and that courts cannot or should not intervene
every time an unflattering words or expression is used.35
The source of much recent authority on abusive words and hyper-
bole is the Fifth Circuit decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bird-
song,36 in which the plaintiff referred to members of the Mississippi
Highway Patrol as "those bastards." The Court of Appeals held:
[T]hese words were used as mere epithets, as terms of abuse and
opprobrium .... Not being intended or understood as statements of
fact they are impossible of proof or disproof. Indeed such words of
vituperation and abuse reflect more on the character of the user
than they do on that of the individual to whom they are intended to
refer. It has long been settled that such words are not of themselves
actionable. 37
This well-established common law principle is not without excep-
tions. When abusive statements contain factual misstatements about
an individual, they may become actionable. The context or circum-
stances in which the words are used is of prime importance. 38 Fre-
quently courts must decide whether the words were used literally or
figuratively. While "son-of-a-bitch" typically would be thought of as
mere name-calling, it has been held to be actionable slander when ad-
dressed to an automobile dealer.39 Indeed, the general rule has not
35. ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2.4.7, at 2-39 (3d ed.
2002). Another view of this principle was expressed in Prosser & Keeton on Torts:
A certain amount of vulgar name-calling is tolerated, on the theory that it will necessa-
rily be understood to amount to nothing more. It may be significant that most of the
cases have involved slander, which would not have been actionable in any event with-
out proof of special damage, but there are occasional decisions in which what would
otherwise be clearly defamatory has been dismissed as only hasty, ill-tempered abuse.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 776.
36. 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
37. Id. at 348 (citing Robbins, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh.) at 541, and Rice, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 417
(1838)). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. e, which states:
There are some statements that are in form statements of opinion, or even of fact,
which cannot reasonably be understood to be meant literally and seriously and are
obviously mere vituperation and abuse. A certain amount of vulgar name-calling is
frequently resorted to by angry people without any real intent to make a defamatory
assertion, and it is properly understood by reasonable listeners to amount to nothing
more. This is particularly true when it is obvious that the speaker has lost his temper
and is merely giving vent to insult.
Id. See also BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 5.4.2.2, at 172-73 (2d ed. 2002).
38. RES[ATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. e, at 176 states in pertinent part:
The circumstances under which verbal abuse is uttered affects the determination of
how it is reasonably to be understood. Words uttered face to face during an altercation
may well be understood merely as abuse or insult, while words written after time for
thought or published in a newspaper may be taken to express the defamatory charge
and to be intended to be taken seriously.
Id. at 176. See also SMOLLA, supra note 23. at §§ 4-13-4-17.
39. White v. Valenta. 13 A.L.R.3d 1271 (Cal. App. 1965).
2002] OPINION AND RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE 27
foreclosed some courts from finding actionable, both as slander and
libel, what is essentially name-calling and abusive language.40
Therefore, the long-standing common law protection for abusive
words, name-calling, and hyperbole does not provide sufficient pro-
tection for rhetorical hyperbole or opinion as used in modern work-
place discourse. 4' The exceptions, differences in state law, and lack of
any true "bright-line" tests are likely to have a chilling effect on the
very speech that should be protected.42 The common law rule has
proven to be inadequate when viewed in the employment context.
C. Common Law Protection for "Fair Comment"
Opinions were actionable at common law if they were sufficiently
derogatory to injure another person's reputation,43 even though the
truth or falsity of the opinion could not be determined. The truth of
the communication was a complete defense.44 This approach existed
until courts began to recognize the tension created by the freedom of
speech on one hand and freedom from injury to reputation on the
other. 45 The qualified privilege of "fair comment" emerged as the
common law's attempt to reconcile these competing interests and pro-
vide some protection for statements of opinion. 46
"Fair comment" originally protected an expression of opinion only
when the communication involved a matter of public concern or inter-
40. Brooks v. Stone, 317 S.E.2d 277, 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding the phrase "bitches"
actionable); Spence v. Flynt. 816 P.2d 771, 772 (Wyo. 1991) (holding the phrase "vermin-infested
turd dispensers" actionable), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1668 (1992).
41. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanynig text.
42. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
43. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. a. See also Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publ'g
Ass'n, 71 N.E. 739 (N.Y. 1904) (holding newspaper article which "ridicules the private life of an
author and represents him as a presumptuous literary freak ... is libelous per se. and cannot be
justified on the ground that it is in jest.").
44. See SMOLLA, supra note 23. at §§ 5.2, 5.11.
45. See Note, Fair Comment. 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1949). The Note analyzes the defenses
of "truth" and "fair comment," stating:
[M]odern courts were gradually relaxing the strict civil liability imposed for defamation
at common law, not so much by defining more narrowly the elements of the offense as
by applying more widely certain already recognized defenses. This choice of technique
reflected the fact that the principal influence toward relaxation of liability was not a
diminished interest in reputation but a recognition that other interests deserved protec-
tion even at the cost of uncompensated defamation.
Id. See also Burton v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936) (stating that "the
utterance of truth is in all circumstances an interest paramount to reputation.").
46. See Note, Fair Comment, supra note 45, at 1212-13. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Patterson, 128
F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.W. 167. 174 (Iowa 1922); Cherry v. Des
Moines Leader, 86 N.W. 323 (Iowa 1901).
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est.47 The privilege also required that expression of an opinion be the
actual opinion of the critic and not made for the sole purpose of caus-
ing harm to the person about whom it was made, regardless of
whether the opinion was reasonable or not.48 Under the majority
common law position, the "fair comment" defense "applied only to an
expression of opinion and not to a false statement of fact, whether it
was expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion. '49
Thus, most courts agreed that the defense protected only statements
of opinion.50  Courts disagreed, however, over whether certain com-
munications were fact or opinion and whether these statements were
within the protected scope of public interests.5 1 Accordingly, courts
were forced to distinguish between fact and opinion. 52
47. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. a.
If the expression of opinion was on a matter of public concern, it was a form of privi-
leged criticism, customarily known by the name of fair comment. The privilege ex-
tended to an expression of opinion on a matter of public concern so long as it was the
actual opinion of the critic and was not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to
the person about whom the comment was made, regardless of whether the opinion was
reasonable or not. According to the majority rule, the privilege of fair comment ap-
plied only to an expression of opinion and not to a false statement of fact, whether it
was expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion.
Id. See, e.g., Moore v. Booth Publ'g Co., 185 N.W. 780 (Mich. 1921) (holding that communica-
tion pertaining to mayor was privileged)- Hall v. Ewing, 74 So. 190 (La. 1917) (holding that
communications pertaining to state senator, judge, and governor were privileged).
48. This is sometimes referred to as common law malice, as opposed to the malice standard set
forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). RESTATEMENr, supra note 7, at
§ 566 cmt. a.
49. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. a. See also Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 83 N.W. 110, 112
(Mich. 1900). This case held that a circular issued to voters encouraging them to vote against a
particular candidate for representative was not privileged. Id. The circular stated that in the last
legislature the candidate "championed measures opposed to the moral interests of the commu-
nity" without stating the measure supported, which happened to be anti-temperance legislation.
Id. The court found that since the factual basis for the opinion was not expressly stated, the
listener was left to speculate as to the acts justifying the opinion. Id. Therefore, the fair com-
ment privilege did not protect the opinion.
50. Note, Developments in the Law Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 925-26 (1956).
51. Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34
RUTGERs L. REV. 81, 86 (1981). Some jurisdictions held that attributing corrupt political mo-
tives to a public figure were not protected under the fair comment privilege. Such comments
were either not considered matters affecting the public, or were considered statements of fact
not qualifying as fair comment. Other jurisdictions held that statements assigning dishonorable
motives to a public official were protected under the fair comment privilege if reasonable
grounds could be established for drawing the inference. Id. at 86-87. See also Peck v. Coos Bay
Times Publ'g Co., 259 P. 307 (Or. 1927): Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Ass'n. 34 A.2d 99 (Vt. 1943):
McClung v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 214 S.W. 193 (Mo. 1919).
52. One commentator concluded that:
The distinction between "facts" and "opinions" here .. .is somewhat nebulous, as a
matter of pure logic .... The important point is whether ordinary persons hearing or
reading the matter complained of would be likely to understand it as an expression of
the writer's opinion, or a direct statement of existing fact.
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D. The Constitutionalization of the Fair Comment and Opinion
Defenses-New York Times and Its Progeny
Much of the common law's "fair comment" protection of opinion
has been discussed within the context of the Constitution by the
United States Supreme Court in a line of cases beginning in 1964 with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.5 3 In 1960, the New York Times
printed a political advertisement containing several false statements of
fact regarding the handling of civil rights demonstrators by the Mont-
gomery, Alabama Police Department. 54 A city commissioner respon-
sible for supervision of the police brought a libel action in state court
against the newspaper.55 The Alabama state court held in favor of the
commissioner, ruling the allegations in the newspaper advertisement
were libelous per se and the newspaper's only defense was to show the
factual allegations were true, an impossible showing under the circum-
stances of the case. 56
The Supreme Court reversed, holding a public official57 is prohib-
ited "from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with 'ac-
tual malice'-that is, with knowledge it was false or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not. ' '58 The Court noted that the
First Amendment was designed to protect the "unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people,"'59 while the Alabama libel statute "dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate land] is inconsistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. '60
Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, supra
note 51, at 90 (quoting 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.29, at 458 (1956)).
53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For an in-depth account of the case, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No
LAW - THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991), and R. Pierce, Jr., The Anat-
omy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 43 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1965). For a
general discussion of the constitutional and tort law ramifications of New York Times, see Arthur
Berney, Libel and the First Amendment, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965): Sheldon Halpern, Of Libel,
Language, And Law: New York Times v. Sullivan At Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1989):
Bruce Ottley et al.. New York Times v. Sullivan: A Retrospective Examination, 33 DEPAUL L.
REV. 741 (1984).
54. Sullivan. 376 U.S. at 261: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962).
55. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 261.
56. Id. at 267.
57. In 1967, the New York Times' "actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth" test
was expanded to include public figures as well as public officials. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
58. Sullivan. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
59. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476. 484 (1957)).
60. Id. at 279.
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The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times created a consti-
tutionally based form of "fair comment," which recognized a "condi-
tional privilege for honest misstatements of fact," and "honest
expression[s] of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, state-
ments of fact." 61 It is a conditional privilege because it can be over-
come by proof that the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice.62
In 1970, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between rhe-
torical hyperbole and defamation in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler.63 Bresler, a real estate developer, sought several zon-
ing variances from the Greenbelt City Council for high-density hous-
ing on his land. Simultaneously, the city council was trying to
purchase a parcel of land from Bresler to construct a high school.
64
Bresler's negotiating demands, based on his bargaining leverage, were
denounced as "blackmail" at a city council meeting. 65 A local news-
paper, published by Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association,
subsequently reported the accusations of "blackmail" in an account of
the city council meeting. 66 Bresler sued the publishers for libel, con-
tending that in reporting the use of the word "blackmail," they "were
charging Bresler with the crime of blackmail, and that since the [pub-
lishers] knew that Bresler had committed no such crime, they could be
held liable for the knowing use of a falsehood. ' 67 The case was sub-
mitted to the jury on this theory and a judgment against the publishers
was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 68
The Supreme Court reversed, holding Bresler, as a public figure,
could only recover with proof of "actual malice" and the jury instruc-
tion, which allowed malice to be found from the language of the publi-
cation itself, constituted an "error of constitutional magnitude. '69 The
Court determined that Bresler was unable to state a defamation
claim.70 "Blackmail," as used during the public debate and in the sub-
sequent publication, was constitutionally protected; it was "no more
than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who con-
sidered Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable." 71
61. Id. at 292 n.30.
62. Id. at 279-80.
63. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 13.
68. Id. See also Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 252 A.2d 755 (Md. 1969).
69. Bresler. 398 U.S. at 10.
70. Id. at 14.
71. Id.
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The Court emphasized the context in which the words appeared, a
public meeting on matters of local governmental interest, was such
that an ordinary reader could not have thought Bresler was being
charged with the crime of blackmail.7 2 Such speech was neither slan-
derous nor libelous, and proof of actual malice was irrelevant. 73 Left
unstated was the rationale for barring rhetorical hyperbole from being
the basis of a defamation action. Was it excluded because it was opin-
ion that no reasonable person would interpret as a statement of fact,
or was it excluded because the statement arose out of discussion of
public affairs and was directed at a public person? Four years later,
the Court appeared to narrow the possibilities.
In 1973, the Court heard Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.74 Gertz was a
civil attorney for the family of a boy killed by a Chicago police of-
ficer.75 American Opinion, a magazine owned by Robert Welch, Inc.,
ran an article accusing Gertz as being the architect of a "frame-up"
against the police officer and referred to Gertz as a "Leninist" and
"Communist-fronter. '' 76 Gertz sued for libel in federal court and was
awarded $50,000 by a jury.77 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, however, entered a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict for Robert Welch Inc., concluding the New York
Times' standard of "actual malice" should apply, even though Gertz
was not a public figure or official, because the article discussed an
issue of public concern. 78 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.79
The Supreme Court reversed, noting the issue in Gertz was whether
the Constitution prohibited a private individual from bringing a defa-
mation suit against a newspaper, which published statements that
caused him injury.80 In balancing the constitutional interest in free
72. Id.
73. See Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.: The Evolution of a Privi-
lege. supra note 51. at 93.
74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
75. Id. at 325. The officer's name was Richard Nuccio. 1d.
76. Id. at 326. The title of the article was "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On
Police." Id. at 325. The article suggested that false testimony was given against Nuccio at trial
and that his prosecution was part of a Communist campaign against the police. Id. at 326.
77. Gertz. 4108 U.S. at 329. Gertz brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois. The only
issue presented to the jury was the proper measure of damages for the publication of the libelous
per se article. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Il1. 1970).
78. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 329.
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972). Although the court of appeals
doubted the correctness of the district court's finding that Gertz was not a public figure. it did
not overturn the finding. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that because the article
concerned a matter of public interest, the New York Times standard applied. Id.
80. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.
2002]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
speech on matters of public concern with the private interest in pro-
tection against wrongful injury to reputation, the Court recognized
private citizens have less opportunity to rebut defamatory allega-
tions.8' Hence, private citizens require more protection than public
figures.8 2 The Court concluded that in the case of private citizens, the
New York Times rule does not apply, and the states are free to apply
any standard of liability short of strict liability for publishers or broad-
casters of defamatory materials.8 3 Gertz, who was a private figure,
was required only to prove the statements were negligently made.84
Thus, Gertz established there was no blanket constitutional protec-
tion for defamatory statements involving a matter of public concern
directed at a private individual. Private individuals could sue for defa-
mation under any standard, short of strict liability, established by the
state in which the claim was brought.
Many believed Justice Lewis F. Powell's dicta in Gertz defined
speech that was constitutionally protected:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correc-
tion not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competi-
tion of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and
wide open" debate on public issues. 85
Based on this passage, many courts and commentators concluded that
opinions enjoyed some type of wholesale constitutional protection. 86
81. Id. at 344.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 347. The court noted that strict liability could require a publisher or broadcaster to
prove the truth of a defamatory statement regarding a private individual. Failing such proof, the
publisher or broadcaster could be held liable for defamation even though every conceivable
precaution was taken to ensure the accuracy of the offending statement. Id. at n.10. Because the
court held that the New York Times standard did not apply to suits by private figures, there was
no constitutional requirement that Gertz prove the defendant knew his statement to be false or
that he recklessly disregarded the truth. In suits brought by private figures, the states are free to
decide whether a negligence, recklessness, or knowing falsity test is to be applied. The majority
reasoned that private individuals are both more vulnerable, as well as more deserving of recov-
ery for defamation, than public figures. Id. at 344. They are more vulnerable because public
figures generally have "significantly greater access" to the media and can use that access to
"counteract false statements." Gertz. 418 U.S. at 344. Private individuals are deserving of exten-
sive protection against defamation, because, unlike private persons, public figures have generally
"voluntarily exposed themselves to the increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood." Id.
at 345.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 339-40 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
86. See infra note 200. See also Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., The
Evolution of a Privilege, supra note 51.
[Vol. 52:19
2002] OPINION AND RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE 33
On the same day the Court decided Gertz, it also handed down its
decision in National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin.87 In Letter Car-
riers, unionized postal workers had been struggling to organize the
remaining non-union letter carriers. To that end, the union published
a newsletter as part of an organizational campaign. The newsletter
listed the names of those employees who had not joined the union
under a heading titled: "List of Scabs. '88 The newsletter also printed
a colorful, derogatory definition, attributed to Jack London, of the
term "scab." 8 9 Three of the employees whose names were listed in
the newsletter brought suit against the union in a Virginia state court.
A jury awarded each of the employees $10,000 in compensatory and
$45,000 in punitive damages. 90
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the statements to be pro-
tected by federal labor law. 91 Specifically, the Court noted the only
statement of fact made by the union, that the employees were "scabs,"
was both literally and factually true and, therefore, could not support
87. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
88. Id. at 267. For other cases involving epithets such as the word "scab," see Barss v. Torches.
785 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that "scab" is literally correct): Cline v. McLeod. 349
S.E.2d 232, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that case law expressly protects the word "scab");
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 495 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that "scab" is not
actionable). aff'd, 501 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986): Local Lodge 1297 v. Allen. 490 N.E.2d
865, 867 (Ohio 1986) (stating that "scab" is federally protected speech): and Crawford v. United
Steel Workers, S.E.2d 828, 830-35 (Va. 1986) (holding that "scab." or "scabby" is federally pro-
tected in the context of a labor dispute).
89. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 268. The definition, as attributed to Jack London:
The Scab
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful
substance left with which He made a scab. A scab is a two-legged animal with a cork-
screw soul, a water brain, and a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others
have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles. When a scab comes down the
street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates
of hell to keep him out. No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a
pool of water to drown his carcass in. or a rope long enough to hang his body with.
Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab. For betraying his Master. he had charac-
ter enough to hang himself. A scab has not. Esau sold his birthright for a mess of
Cottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his
country for a promise of a commission in the British Army. The scab sells his birthright,
country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his
employer. Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to God; Benedict Arnold
was a traitor to his country; A SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and
his class.
Id.
90. Id. at 268-69.
91. Id. at 283. The relevant federal law is Exec. Order No. 11.491. 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969),
rather than the NLRA. Executive Order Number 11.491 established a labor-management rela-
tions system for federal employment, which is similar to the NLRA.
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a claim for defamation.92 The other claims of the employees, based on
language within the definition such as "traitor, '93 were held to be non-
actionable opinions. 94 The Court stated, "Such words were obviously
used here in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union's
strong disagreement with the view of those workers who oppose
unionization. Expression of such an opinion, even in the most pejora-
tive terms, is protected under federal labor law."' 95 The Court, com-
paring the statements of the union to the accusation of "blackmail"
made in Bresler, noted the "definition of a 'scab' is merely rhetorical
hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by
union members towards those who refuse to join. '96
Once again, the Court did not clearly explain whether the definition
of "scab" was non-actionable because it was nothing more than rheto-
ric and hyperbole and thus non-actionable opinion, or whether it was
protected speech because of the policy considerations of federal labor
law. If its decision was based upon the dictates of federal labor policy,
Letter Carriers would have little impact outside of the labor context.
If the basis was opinion, however, then the Court recognized some
sort of constitutional privilege for opinion. 97
The Court had the opportunity to reexamine the relationship be-
tween hyperbole and defamation in 1988 with Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell.98 In 1983, Hustler Magazine published an advertisement par-
ody depicting television evangelist Jerry Falwell having sex with his
92. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 283 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTiON-
ARY (unabridged ed. 1961)) (stating that "[o]ne of the generally accepted definitions of 'scab' is
'one who refuses to join a union,' and it is undisputed that the appellees had in fact refused to
join the Branch.").
93. Letter Carriers. 418 U.S. at 281. In particular, the appellees contended that they had been
charged as traitors, having "rotten principles," and lacking "character." Id.
94. Id. at 284.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 286. The Court explained that there may be situations where a "writing or other
similar rhetoric in a labor dispute could be actionable, particularly if some of its words were
taken out of context and used in such a way as to convey a false representation of fact." Id. But
in this case, the Court held "no such factual representation [could] reasonably be inferred and,
the publication [was] protected under the federal labor laws." Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 286-
87.
97. See infra note 200.
98. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). For further discussion of the case, see Robert Post. The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990); Paul A. LeBel, Emotional Distress, The First
Amendment and "This Kind of Speech:" A Historical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 315 (1989): Rodney Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First
Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell. 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423 (1988): RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FiYNT: THE FIRsT AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1988).
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mother in an outhouse.99 Falwell brought suit in federal court alleging
libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.100 The jury found for Hustler on the defamation claim, but for
Falwell on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.' 0 ' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
emotional distress judgment, holding the "actual malice" standard of
New York Times did not apply to that claim. 10 2
The Supreme Court disagreed. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, left no doubt as to the status of First Amend-
ment protection of speech concerning public figures.'0 3 The Court
emphasized public figures substantially shape events and American
citizens have a right to criticize these public figures. 10 4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist warned, "[T]he candidate who vaunts his spotless record
and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry 'Foul!' when an oppo-
nent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the con-
trary."10 5 The Court concluded that public figures and officials, to
prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, must
prove the complained of publication contained a false statement of
fact that was made with actual malice.10 6
The Court determined that Falwell was a public figure and that he
had failed to prove the advertisement parody contained a false state-
ment of fact.' 0 7 In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied upon
the jury's determination that the parody could not "reasonably be un-
derstood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events
99. An advertising campaign for Campari Liqueur featured celebrities talking about their
"first time." The phrase, "Campari. You'll never forget your first time." accompanied each ad-
vertisement. The parody contained a picture of Falwell, a picture of a bottle and a glass of
Campari Liqueur, and a fictional interview with Falwell. The "interview" depicted Falwell stat-
ing that his "first time" was during a drunken, incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an
outhouse. See Smolla, supra note 98, at 428.
100. Falwell. 485 U.S. at 47-48.
101. Id. at 48. The Court directed a verdict against Falwell on his invasion of privacy claim. Id.
102. Id. at 49-50.
103. Id. at 50-51.
104. Id. at 51.
105. Falwell. 485 U.S. at 51-52 (quoting Monitor Patriot v. Roy. 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971)).
Monitor involved a libel suit brought by an unsuccessful political candidate against a local news-
paper that had characterized him as a "former small-time bootlegger." The Court in that case
held that the New York Times standard applied to political candidates as well as officeholders.
Monitor Patriot. 401 U.S. at 265.
106. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51-52.
107. Id. at 50. Although the Supreme Court did not directly consider the opinion defense, it
extended First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and intended to inflict
emotional distress, but only where the "speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as
stating actual facts about the public figure." Id.
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in which [he] participated."10 8 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in
Falwell seemed to reaffirm First Amendment protection for rhetorical
hyperbole.
In summary, the Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times,
Bresler, Gertz, Letter Carriers, and Falwell appeared to expand protec-
tion for opinion and rhetorical hyperbole. However, the underlying
rationale and the boundaries of protection were unclear. One com-
mentator suggested the Court had "set the outer 'ground rules'-
opinion [is] absolutely protected, but misstatements of facts [are]
not-and left it to case-by-case development ... to work out more
sensitive and refined definitions."10 9
E. The Evolution of the Restatement of Torts
While lower courts used the Supreme Court's holdings as guidance,
they also turned to the Restatement of Torts. The Restatement (First)
of Torts took the position that a defamation action could be premised
on the expression of an opinion based on "facts known or assumed by
both parties to the communication." ' 10 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts retained substantially all of Section 566 of the Restatement
(First) of Torts.1 11 Shortly after the Restatement was adopted, how-
ever, the Supreme Court decided Gertz and Letter Carriers.11 2 In re-
sponse, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed a revised Section
566, which contained significant changes:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the
form of an opinion. A statement of this nature, at least if it is on a
matter of public concern, is actionable, however, only if it also ex-
presses, or implies the assertion of, a false and defamatory fact
which is not known or assumed by both parties to the
communication.1 13
This proposed revision of Section 566 suggested that "mere expres-
sions of opinion on matters not of 'public concern' could be actionable
108. Id. at 57.
109. SMOLLA, supra note 23. at § 6.13. 6-20.
110. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566, at 156 (1938). The original text of Section 566 reads: "A
defamatory communication may consist of a statement of opinion based upon facts known or
assumed by both parties to the communication.' Id. The original text of Section 567 reads: "A
defamatory communication may consist of a statement of opinion based upon undisclosed facts."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 567 (1938). See also Manley v. Harer. 235 P. 757 (Mont. 1925) (hold-
ing that, in a petition to county commissioners, statement that road supervisor "does not put in
full time, but draws warrants for full time," was libelous per se).
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1965): RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (Tentative Draft No. 12. 1966).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566. at 6 (Tentative Draft No. 21. 1975).
113. Id.
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even if they did not express or imply the assertion of a 'false and de-
famatory fact, which is not known or assumed by both parties to the
communication.""' 14
Subsequently, the ALI struck the language "at least if it is on a
matter of public concern" from Section 566, a step necessitated by the
dicta in Gertz.-' Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
now reads: "A defamatory communication may consist of a statement
in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable
only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the
basis for the opinion."' 1 6
Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) recognizes two types of
opinion: "pure" and "mixed."' 17 A comment is a "pure" opinion
114. George Christie. Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1621, 1630 (1977). Comment c, however, stated "it is possible that private communica-
tions on private matters will be treated differently. the logic of the constitutional principle would
appear to apply to all expressions of opinion of the first, or pure, type." RESTATEMENT. supra
note 7. at § 566 cmt. c.
115. 52 A.L.I. PROC. 155 (1975). The Restatement position was:
The common law rule that an expression of opinion of the first, or pure. type may be
the basis of an action for defamation now appears to have been rendered unconstitu-
tional by U.S. Supreme Court decisions. As the Court says in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.. 418 U.S. 323. 339 (1974): "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem. we depend for its correction not
on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." This categoric statement was not
necessary to the decision, and the Supreme Court's indications that an expression of
opinion cannot be the basis of a defamation action have involved public communica-
tions on matters of public concern. Although it is thus possible that private communi-
cations on private matters will be treated differently, the logic of the constitutional
principle would appear to apply to all expressions of opinion of the first, or pure, type.
RESrATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. c.
116. 52 A.L.I. PROC. at 170.
117. RESrATEMENT,. supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. c.
There are two kinds of expression of opinion. The simple expression of opinion, or the
pure type. occurs when the maker of the comment states the facts on which he bases his
opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses a comment as to the plaintiff's conduct,
qualifications or character. The statement of facts and the expression of opinion based
on them are separate matters in this case. and at common law either or both could be
defamatory and the basis for an action for libel or slander. The opinion may be ostensi-
bly in the form of a factual statement if it is clear from the context that the maker is not
intending to assert another objective fact but only his personal comment on the facts,
which he has stated .... The second kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type,
is one, which, while an opinion in form or context, is apparently based on facts regard-
ing the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated bv the defendant or assumed
to exist by the parties to the communication. Here the expression of the opinion gives
rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the
opinion expressed by the defendant. To say of a person that he is a thief without ex-
plaining why. may. depending upon the circumstances, be found to imply the assertion
that he has committed acts that come within the common connotation of thieverv. To
declare, without an indication of the basis for the conclusion, that a person is utterly
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where either the speaker states the facts on which the opinion is based
or the recipient of the statement is already aware of the facts upon
which the opinion is based." 8 The opinion, even if unreasonable or
outrageous, is protected so long as the factual basis for the opinion is
true.'19
A "mixed" opinion, on the other hand, does not include disclosure
of facts upon which it is based or awareness by the recipient of the
factual basis for the opinion. 120 Instead, a mixed opinion consists of a
statement of opinion by the speaker that implies the existence of un-
disclosed defamatory facts.121 Pure opinions under the Restatement
(Second) are protected, while mixed opinions may be actionable. 122
The ALI also eliminated the "fair comment" sections of the Re-
statement (Second), reasoning that because only false statements of
fact were actionable, whether the comment was fair or not was no
longer relevant. 123 Thus, the Restatement (Second) took the position
that, under Gertz, opinions that did not imply the existence of undis-
closed defamatory facts enjoy an absolute, constitutionally-based priv-
ilege, and this protection of opinions extended to both private and
public concerns, as well as private citizens and public officials. 124 The
devoid of moral principals may be found to imply the assertion that he has been guilty
of conduct that would justify the reaching of that conclusion. It was the first, or pure,
type of expression of opinion to which the privilege of fair comment was held to apply.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at § 566 cmt. c.
The distinction between the two types of expression of opinion [is] constitutionally sig-
nificant. The requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant published a defama-
tory statement of fact about him that was false (see § 558) can be complied with by
proving the publication of an expression of opinion of the mixed type, if the comment is
reasonably understood as implying the assertion of the existence of undisclosed facts
about the plaintiff that must be defamatory in character in order to justify the opinion.
A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is
not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unrea-
sonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is. But an expression of opinion that
is not based on disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undis-
closed facts on which the opinion is based, is treated differently.
Id. at § 566 cmt. c.
120. Id. at § 566 cmt. b.
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 566 cmt. a. To state that a person is a thief without
explaining why, might imply an assertion that he has committed acts of thievery. Id. Comment c
further explains that the difference between "pure" and "mixed" opinions is in the effect on the
recipient of the communication. A "mixed" opinion is similar to a communication subject to
more than one meaning. Id.
122. Id.
123. 52 A.L.I. PRoc. 155 (1975).
124. See Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privi-
lege, supra note 51, at 98.
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ALI, however, was not alone in its adjustment to the Supreme Court's
presumed creation of a constitutional privilege for opinions. Lower
courts were left with the unenviable task of designing ways to distin-
guish actionable statements of fact from non-actionable statements of
opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, rarely providing better guidance than
Justice Potter Stewart's pronouncement on pornography that "I know
it when I see it."1125
F. Tests Used to Distinguish Fact from Opinion Before Milkovich
In addition to the "pure" opinion approach of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, other tests used by lower courts included the "total-
ity of the circumstances" and the "provable as false" 126 tests.
1. Application of the Restatement Approach to Workplace
Defamation
Since the revision of Section 566, several courts have clarified the
distinctions between "pure" and "mixed" opinions under the Restate-
ment. In applying the Restatement rationale, the court in Hoover v.
Peerless Publications, Inc.,127 found a letter from the plaintiff's former
employer to a prospective employer indicating he had some mental
problems actionable.1 28 Although the court held the communication
was an expression of opinion, not fact, the former employer's state-
ments fell into the category of "mixed" opinion, since the communica-
tion failed to disclose any stated or assumed facts on which the former
employer's conclusion could have been based.' 29
The court in Adler v. American Standard Corp.130 reached a similar
conclusion regarding comments in a former employee's discharge let-
ter stating he had been terminated "for unsatisfactory perform-
125. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
126. The "provable as false" test was first used by the Supreme Court, although not in the
opinion context, in Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). After Hepps, a
plaintiff suing a media defendant for speech of public concern must prove both fault and falsity
in order to recover. The applicability of the "provable as false" test to labor or employment
disputes is unclear, because the Court explicitly declined to decide whether the rule applied to
cases involving non-media defendants, such as an employer or a labor union. Id. at 796.
127. 461 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
128. Id. at 1210.
129. Id. at 1209. The court went on to explain that "[t]he basic rule regarding a 'mixed' ex-
pression of opinion is that it is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defama-
tory facts as the basis for the opinion." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566
(1977)). The former employer's statements were capable of being defamatory simply because
the jury might find that his conclusions were based on facts which were not disclosed in the
letter. Id. at 1210.
130. Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982).
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ance."' 131 The comments were found to be "mixed" opinion and, as
such, could reasonably be based on undisclosed defamatory facts sub-
ject to liability. 132 The District Court of Maryland found that the
statements implied plaintiff was guilty of some form of "misconduct,
negligence, or incompetence in the performance of his duties." 133
Courts also relied upon the Restatement's "pure opinion" doctrine.
In Burns v. Supermarkets General Corp.,134 the employer justified ter-
minating an employee for improperly reducing the price of goods, by
likening the conduct to "stealing."'' 35 The District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania held the statement was not actionable,
reasoning the recipient of the communication had been given the un-
derlying facts of improperly reducing merchandise, and was, there-
fore, able to draw his own conclusion about the opinion expressed by
the employer. 136
The same court, in McFadden v. Burton,137 relied upon the Restate-
ment's "pure opinion" standard to reject an employee's claims against
his employer and two of his employer's customers.138 McFadden was
a limousine driver who suffered from a congenital condition, which
caused him to walk with a limp.1 39 Two customers of the limousine
service complained that they "felt embarrassed about having a person
who limped carrying packages in front of or behind him," and one said
he did "not feel comfortable riding with a handicapped driver.' 140
The limousine service prohibited him from driving for the com-
plaining customers and subsequently terminated his employment. 14'
McFadden brought a defamation action against the service, its two
131. Id. at 576. As to expressions of opinion, which indicate a basis of undisclosed facts, the
court explained that "if the recipient draws the reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opin-
ion expressed in the comment must have been based on undisclosed defamatory facts, the defen-
dant is subject to liability." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c, at 173
(1977)).
132. Hoover, 461 F. Supp. at 576.
133. Id.
134. Burns v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
135. Id. at 158. The produce supervisor reviewed the plaintiff's discharge with the lead pro-
duce clerk and commented that reducing merchandise improperly was "like stealing." Id.
136. Id. at 157-58.
137. 645 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
138. Id. at 462.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 461. The plaintiff testified he had heard from one of the owners of the limousine
service that celebrities Richard Burton and Brook Williams asked that he be replaced as the
Burton party chauffeur. The owner allegedly told the plaintiff that Williams asked to have him
removed because he felt embarrassed having his packages carried by a person who limped. Ad-
ditionally, Burton, his wife, and his secretary felt uncomfortable riding with a handicapped
driver. Id.
141. Id. at 459.
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owners, and two of the service's customers, actors Brooks Williams
and Richard Burton.
The court held the customers' comments to be expressions of opin-
ion and not actionable, since the underlying facts of the opinion had
been disclosed and any assumed facts were non-defamatory.142 It rea-
soned an opinion "based on disclosed or assumed non-defamatory
facts is not, itself, sufficient for an action or defamation, no matter
how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how
derogatory." 143
The court went on to dissect the bases for the customer's opin-
ions.1 44 As to the comments concerning McFadden's limp, the court
found they could not form the basis of a defamation claim because
they were true; McFadden did walk with a limp.' 45 As to the com-
ments concerning the embarrassment of Williams and Burton, about
having a person with a limp carrying packages for them, the court con-
cluded such comments, based on the non-defamatory fact of McFad-
den's limp, were "pure opinion" and could not be considered
defamatory, no matter how unreasonable the comment. 46
The Restatement approach was also used in Steinhilber v. Al-
phonse.147 Steinhilber, a union member, continued to work during a
strike in violation of a union strike order and union rules.t 48 Subse-
quently, she resigned and the union assessed a fine against her for
crossing the picket line.' 4 9 Several months later, a union official made
a tape-recorded telephone message, referring to Steinhilber as "Lou-
ise the scab Steinhilber," and commenting on what he claimed to be
her lack of "talent, ambition, and initiative." t5 0 The message played
142. Burton. 645 F. Supp. at 462. It was "undisputed that plaintiff suffered from a shortening
of the leg that force[d] him to walk with a limp." Id. Furthermore, the statements by defendants
about their embarrassment was simply their emotional reaction to a non-defamatory fact con-
cerning the plaintiff. Id.
143. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SI COND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Burton. 645 F. Supp. at 462. See also Avins v. Moll. 610 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(holding that law school dean's statements in response to a telephone interview that the former
dean was a -nothing" at the law school were clearly his personal opinion and, therefore, did not
give rise to a defamation claim): McConnell v. Howard Univ., 621 F. Supp. 327. 331 (D.D.C.
1985) (holding that statements made by university personnel to the effect that the plaintiff, in
refusing to teach his class, neglected his professional duties were in essence "evaluation opin-
ions" that would not support an action for defamation). Under the Restatement, virtually all
"evaluative only" opinions would be non-actionable, since they are by definition based on dis-
closed facts. See SMOLLA. supra note 23. at § 6:34. 6-67.
147. 501 N.E.2d 550. 552 (N.Y. 1986).
148. Id. at 551.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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automatically for anyone dialing the private telephone number pro-
vided to union members. In addition, during picketing, a banner was
displayed on a union official's truck, which stated "#1 SCAB LOUISE
STEINHILBER SUCKS." 15' Steinhilber sued for defamation.
The court held that both the telephone message and the banner
were non-actionable expressions of "pure opinion;" "a tasteless effort
to lampoon plaintiff for her activities as a 'scab,"' and intended as an
expression of the union's disapproval that she had crossed the picket
line. 152
Thus, opinions that include facts, which themselves are not defama-
tory, or language that is rhetoric, hyperbole, or epithet have been held
to be "pure" opinion and not actionable. However, if the opinion does
not include supporting facts, or the listener does not know those facts,
such opinion is "mixed" with implications of unknown facts, and is
actionable.
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Workplace
Defamation
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia at-
tempted to develop a different test to distinguish fact from opinion.
In Olman v. Evans,153 a political science professor brought a defama-
tion action against two newspaper columnists who had written an arti-
cle critical of his nomination to head the Department of Government
and Politics at the University of Maryland.1 54 In an attempt to deter-
mine whether statements in the article were non-actionable opinion or
actionable fact, the Court of Appeals set forth four factors to deter-
mine how, under the "totality of the circumstances," the average
reader or listener would view the statement:
(1) whether the allegedly defamatory statement has a precise
meaning and thus is likely to give rise to clear factual
implications;
(2) the degree to which the statements are verifiable-is the state-
ment objectively capable of proof or disproof?;
(3) the context in which the statement occurs; and
(4) the broader social context into which the statement fits.1 55
151. Id.
152. Id. at 556.
153. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
154. Id. at 971-73.
155. Id. at 979-83.
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After applying its four-part test, the court concluded that the colum-
nists' statements were constitutionally protected expressions of
opinion. 156
The Eighth Circuit adopted the Ollman test in Janklow v. News-
week,t 57 but modified and shortened it to include an analysis of: (1)
the statement's precision and specificity; (2) the statement's ver-
ifiability; (3) the social and literary context in which the statement was
made; and (4) the statement's public context.1 58
In workplace defamation cases, the "totality of the circumstances"
analysis has been widely used to distinguish fact from opinion.t 59
Among other factors, courts consider the context in which the state-
ment was made; each word used, not just a mere phrase taken out of
context; cautionary terms, which accompanied the statement; the me-
dium used; and the audience.' 60
G. Application of Federal Labor Law to Workplace
Defamation Before Milkovich
Labor disputes are hotbeds for potentially defamatory statements.
Federal labor law provides protection to statements made in this con-
text, often tolerating "intemperate, abusive and inaccurate state-
156. Id. at 986-92.
157. 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 1302-03.
159. See Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80. 83 (2d Cir. 1985). In Davis, entertainer Diana Ross
circulated a letter containing the names of seven former employees and the statement. "[lJf I let
an employee go. it's because either their work or their personal habits are not acceptable to me."
Id. at 81. A former employee named in the letter sued based on its defamatory content. The
court considered the circumstances and concluded that the communication was actionable be-
cause of the implied factual assertion of the former employee's professional incompetence. Id.
at 84-85. See also Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1976). In Gregory.
union officers brought an action against the employer for two allegedly defamatory statements
arising out of retroactive application of a pay increase in the union's labor agreement with the
employer. Id. at 426. The alleged statement was that "there were some internal politics within
Local 148 and other areas of the UAW which certain individuals were using to seek personal gain
and political prestige rather than to serve the best interests of the members they were supposed
to represent." Id. at 427. The California Supreme Court held the statements were not actiona-
ble as expressions of opinion and not false assertions of fact. Id. at 429-30. Under a "totality of
the circumstances" analysis. the court determined that the comments: (1) were made in the con-
text of a spirited labor dispute and were of the type where "the judgment, loyalties and subjec-
tive motive of rivals are reciprocally attacked and defended, frequently with considerable heat:"
(2) were not of a type "calculated to induce the audience ... to conclude or understand that they
are factual:" and (3) were "cautiously phrased in terms of apparency" given the expected give
and take of a spirited labor dispute. Id. at 429-30.
160. See supra note 159.
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ments."' 6 1 This protection is based upon federal labor law's policy of
encouraging debate on issues dividing labor and management.
In the 1966 case of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,1 62 the
United States Supreme Court examined the potential conflict between
federal labor and state defamation laws.1 63 In Linn, a company offi-
cial brought a defamation claim for statements made by the union in a
leaflet distributed during an organizational campaign.1 64 The Court
held that the National Labor Relations Act did not necessarily pre-
empt state defamation actions, which were merely a "peripheral con-
cern of the Act."'' 65  In balancing the legitimate state interest in
protecting citizens' reputations and the national labor policy of free
debate on issues dividing labor and management, the Court held fed-
eral law did not protect all statements made during labor disputes. 66
Applying the New York Times actual malice standard to statements
issued during labor disputes, the Court held such statements were only
actionable when "circulated with malice" and where there were actual
damages.1 67 Therefore, even the most repulsive speech in a union dis-
pute is immune from a defamation action so long as it is not a deliber-
ate or reckless untruth and a court is precluded, by federal labor law,
from applying state remedies for defamation unless the complainant
pleads and proves "actual malice" and shows actual damages. 168
161. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant & Guard Workers. 383 U.S. 53 (1966). See also NLRB v.
Container Corp. of Am., 649 F.2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally Derek Bok. The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics and Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
162. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 56.
165. Id. at 61.
166. Id. The definition of "labor dispute" under the National Labor Relations Act includes:
any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, chang-
ing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1978). For cases interpreting the meaning of "labor dispute," see Austin, 418
U.S. at 272; Linn, 383 U.S. at 61: Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 232. 586 F.2d 691 694
n.3 (9th Cir. 1978): Mountain Navigation Co. v. Seafarers. 348 F. Supp. 1298. 1302-03 (D. Wis.
1971): Tosti v. Avik, 437 N.E.2d 1062. 1064 (Mass. 1982): and Raffensberger v. Moran, 495 A.2d
447. 452 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
167. Linn. 383 U.S. at 65.
168. Id. at 64-65: see Cline v. McLeod. 349 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (describing the
situation where a union engaged in a strike disseminated a letter to union members naming
eighteen "scabs" who crossed the picket line, including a drawing depicting an "Anatomy of a
Scab:" the court found the letter and drawing to be protected by the NLRA as "metaphorical
and clearly represent[ing] opinion rather than fact."). For an example of the application of state
defamation law in the absence of federal labor law, see Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1940) (affirming injunction against union picketers on the grounds that the language
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In 1974, eight years after Linn, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
position that defamatory statements arising out of a labor dispute gov-
erned by federal law are not actionable under state law unless they
were made with "actual malice" in National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
Austin.t 69 As previously discussed, Letter Carriers appeared to recog-
nize protection based upon federal labor law, allowing parties to a
labor dispute to use abusive or insulting language without fear of pen-
alty.170 Such statements could not form the basis of a defamation
claim, as no reasonable person would believe the statements ex-
pressed actual or implied facts regarding the subject of the
statements.1 7
1
Many courts, following the reasoning of Letter Carriers, protected
statements made in the context of labor disputes under the "hyper-
bole, rhetoric, epithet" rationale.t 72 For example, the Ohio Supreme
Court, in Yeager v. Local Union 20,173 held picket signs and handbills
used by the picketers, "Bradshaw Motor Company is Unfair to Organized Labor Carpenters
Union No. 1201." was false, because Bradshaw had no control over which its contractor hired.
The court found this language to be libelous and thus not a lawful means of protest protected by
article 5153 R.C.S. of 1925).
169. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 264. The Court emphasized that a union's vigorous efforts "to
persuade other employees to join" should not be "stifled by the threat of liability for it's over
enthusiastic use of rhetoric." Id. at 277. The Court held that "any publication made during the
course of union organizing efforts, which is arguably relevant to that organizational activity, is
entitled to the protection of Linn." Id. at 279. Letter Carriers differed from Linn in that the pre-
emptive power in Linn came from the National Labor Relations Act, while Letter Carriers was
based on section 10 of Executive Order Number 11.491. governing labor management relations
in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Linn. 383 U.S. at 53: Letter Carriers. 418
U.S. at 266.
170. Letter Carriers. 418 U.S. at 283-87.
171. Id. For an interesting variation on the typical set of facts, see Dunn v. AirLine Pilots
Ass'n, 836 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Fla. 1993), affd. 193 F.3d 1185 (1 1th Cir. 1999). In Dunn, a group
of workers crossed a picket line during an allegedly invalid strike. After being named on a scab
list, they brought suit. contending that since the strike was not properly authorized, the name
-scab' was inaccurate. In a two to one decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of
summary judgment against them. Id,
172. See Great Lakes Steel v. NLRB. 625 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that reference to
company's policy of providing ambulance service as murderous policy was mere hyperbole and
protected under section seven of the National Labor Relations Act and 29 U.S.C. § 157. as read
in accord with Linn and Letter Carriers): NLRB. v. Container Corp. of Am., 649 F.2d 1213 (6th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that bulletin posted by Union vice-president referred to Gen-
eral Manager as a "slave driver" and manager's employees as his "chain gang" was protected as
rhetoric under section seven of the NLRA as read in accord with Linn and Letter Carriers): Nat'l
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Cent. Broad. Corp.. 396 N.E.2d 996. 1000-02 (Mass. 1979). cert.
denied. 446 U.S. 935 (1980) (holding charge that Union faced an "inroad of communism" was
not actionable based on disclosed facts and because it was "mere pejorative rhetoric"): Hob Nob
Hill Rest. v. Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Intern'l Union. 660 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Cal.
1987) (finding that accusations of communism, theft, and double sets of books to be either pro-
tected statements of opinion or so nonsensical as not to be considered representations of fact).
173. 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
describing a managerial employee as being a "Little Hitler" and ac-
cusing him of operating a "Nazi concentration camp" were mere hy-
perbole or rhetoric and were not actionable. 174
While courts routinely relied on federal labor law as the basis for
protecting hyperbole and opinion in labor disputes, they usually cited
Linn and Letter Carriers as supporting authority. This raised the issue
of whether the principles underlying Linn and Letter Carriers were
applicable outside of the labor context as part of some type of consti-
tutional protection for opinion, or whether the protection only existed
where federal labor law and opinion intersected. 175  In 1990, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the viability of constitutional
protection for opinion regardless of the setting in which it was made.
III. MILKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL CO.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
The controversy that later became Milkovich v. Lorain Journal176
began in 1975, when the Willoughby News-Herald177 published a col-
umn critical of Michael Milkovich, the wrestling coach of Maple
Heights High School. The column concerned Milkovich's role in his
team's altercation with another high school team at a wrestling meet
and the subsequent investigatory hearing before the Ohio High
School Athletic Association (OHSAA). 78  Both Milkovich and
School Superintendent H. Don Scott testified before the OHSAA,
which suspended the school's wrestling team from state competition.
Milkovich and Scott later testified during a suit brought by several
174. Id. at 667. See also Crawford v. United Steelworkers, 335 S.E.2d 828 (Va. 1985). Larry
Crawford crossed the picket line at the Virginia Lime plant and applied for and accepted a job in
the place of striking employees. Whenever Crawford crossed the picket line and entered the
plant he was called "cocksucker," "motherfucker." "bastard," and "son-of-a-bitch" by various
union members. Id. at 832. Crawford sued both the union and individual employees, alleging
defamation. Relying on Linn and Letter Carriers, the Virginia Supreme Court held that under
the circumstances of a labor dispute, the use of the terms "cocksucker." "motherfucker," "bas-
tard," and "son-of-a-bitch" regarding workers crossing a union picket line could not reasonably
be interpreted to convey a false representation of fact and were simply rhetorical hyperbole. Id.
175. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 283-87.
176. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). For a discussion of Milkovich, see Daniel Anker, Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co.: The Balance Tips, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613 (1991): T.R. Hager, Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.: Lost Breathing Space - Supreme Court Stifles Freedom of Expression By
Eliminating First Amendment Opinion Privilege, 65 TUL. L. REV. 944 (1991); Lisa Herkowitz.
Note, One Bad Bit of Dictum Deserves Another: Gertz and Milkovich, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1159
(1992).
177. The Willoughby News-Herald is a daily newspaper owned by the Lorain Journal Com-
pany. It circulates in Lake County, Ohio, the home of Mentor High School. Milkovich, 497 U.S.
at 4.
178. Id. at 3-4. The visiting wrestling team was from Mentor High School, Mentor, Ohio. Id.
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parents against OHSAA that led to a Common Pleas Court overturn-
ing the OHSAA ruling and reinstating the Maple Heights team to
state competition. 179
The newspaper's sports column, published the day after the court's
decision, stated in part, "Anyone who attended [the meet] ... knows
in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." 180 The column's head-
179. Id. at 4. The Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, tried the suit approxi-
mately 150 miles from where the fracas had occurred and from each of the teams' hometowns.
180. Id. at 5. The column read in its entirety:
Yesterday in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Judge Paul Martin overturned
an Ohio High School Athletic Assn. decision to suspend the Maple Heights wrestling
team from this year's state tournament.
It's not final yet - the judge granted Maple only a temporary injunction against the
ruling - but unless the judge acts much more quickly than he did in this decision (he has
been deliberating since a Nov. 8 hearing) the temporary injunction will allow Maple to
compete in the tournament and make any further discussion meaningless.
But there is something much more important involved here than whether Maple was
denied due process by the OHSAA, the basis of the temporary injunction.
When a person takes on a job in a school, whether it be as a teacher, coach, administra-
tor or even maintenance worker, it is well to remember that his primary job is that of
educator.
There is scarcely a person concerned with school who doesn't leave his mark in some
way on the young people who pass his way - many are the lessons taken away from
school by students, which weren't learned, from a lesson plan or out of a book. They
come from personal experiences with and observations of their superiors and peers,
from watching action and reactions.
Such a lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet
of last Feb. 8.
A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they learned early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you
stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really
happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling coach. Mike Milkovich.
and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
Last winter they were faced with a difficult decision. Milkovich's ranting from the side
of the mat and egging the crowd on against the meet official and the opposing team
backfired during a meet with Greater Cleveland Conference rival Metor [sic], and re-
sulted in first the Maple Heights team, then many of the partisan crowd attacking the
Mentor squad in a brawl which sent four Mentor wrestlers to the hospital.
Naturally, when Mentor protested to the governing body of high school sports, the
OHSAA. the two men were called on the carpet to account for the incident.
But they declined to walk into the hearing and face up to their responsibilities, as one
would hope a coach of Milkovich's accomplishments and reputation would do, and one
would certainly expect from a man with the responsible position of superintendent of
schools.
Instead they chose to come to the hearing and misrepresent the things that happened to
the OHSAA Board of Control, attempting not only to convince the board of their own
innocence, but, incredibly, shift the blame of the affair to Mentor.
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line read: "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,'" followed with a pho-
tograph of the columnist and the words "TD Says." 18t
Milkovich sued the paper for defamation, alleging the article ac-
cused him of committing the crime of perjury and damaged him in his
teaching and coaching professions.' 1 2 Thus began fifteen years of liti-
gation. The trial court originally granted the newspaper's motion for a
directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence failed to establish
the article was published with actual malice as required by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.18 3 The Ohio Court of Appeals, holding there
was sufficient evidence of actual malice to present the case to the jury,
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.18 4 The Ohio Supreme
Court refused to certify the issue for appeal, and the United States
Supreme Court denied the newspaper's petition for certiorari. 8 5
I was among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which the trouble broke out, and I
also attended the hearing before the OHSAA, so I was in a unique position of being
the only non-involved party to observe both the meet itself and the Milkovich-Scott
version presented to the board.
Any resemblance between the two occurrences [sic] is purely coincidental.
To anyone who was at the meet, it need only be said that the Maple coach's wild ges-
tures during the events leading up to the brawl were passed off by the two as "shrugs,"
and that Milkovich claimed he was "Powerless to control the crowd" before the melee.
Fortunately, it seemed at the time, the Milkovich-Scott version of the incident
presented to the board of control had enough contradictions and obvious untruths so
that the six board members were able to see through it.
Probably as much in distasteful reaction to the chicanery of the two officials as in dis-
pleasure over the actual incident, the board then voted to suspend Maple from this
year's tournament and to put Maple Heights, and both Milkovich and his son, Mike Jr.
(the Maple Jaycee coach), on two-year probation.
But unfortunately, by the time the hearing before Judge Martin rolled around,
Milkovich and Scott apparently had their version of the incident polished and recon-
structed, and the judge apparently believed them.
"I can say that some of the stories told to the judge sounded pretty darned unfamiliar,"
said Dr. Harold Meyer, commissioner of the OHSAA, who attended the hearing. "It
certainly sounded different from what they told us."
Nevertheless, the judge bought their story, and ruled in their favor.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impar-
tial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high school
administrators and coaches?
I think not.
Id. at 5 n.2.
181. Milkovich. 497 U.S. at 4. "TD" are the initials for columnist Ted Diadiun. Id.
182. Superintendent Scott filed his own suit against the newspaper alleging a claim of defama-
tion. Id. at 8.
183. Id. at 7.
184. Id. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 416 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
185. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 8 (1990). See Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966
(1980), for the first denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
OPINION AND RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE
On remand, the newspaper was granted summary judgment on the
ground that the article was a constitutionally protected opinion under
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.186 In addition, the court noted that
Milkovich, a public figure, had failed to establish a prima facie case of
actual malice.1 87 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. 188 The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded. The court first de-
termined Milkovich was neither a public figure nor a public official. It
then found the statements in the column were factual assertions and
not constitutionally protected as opinions of the author. 189 The
United States Supreme Court denied the newspaper's second petition
for a writ of certiorari in 1985.190
Before the case was retried, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a separate
defamation action brought by H. Don Scott, Superintendent of
Schools for the City of Maple Heights, against the Lorain Journal aris-
ing out of the same article, reversed its earlier holding in Milkovich
and found the column to be "constitutionally protected opinion."19'
Considering itself bound by the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in
Scott, the Ohio Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the newspaper.' 92 After the Ohio
Supreme Court refused to accept jurisdiction of Milkovich's appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari. 93
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the First Amend-
ment does not require a separate "opinion" privilege limiting the ap-
plication of state defamation laws. 194
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court's opinion began with a discussion of the origin
and evolution of defamation law. 195 It noted that under the common
law, an expression of opinion could be defamatory if it was sufficiently
derogatory to another's reputation. 196 The privilege of "fair com-
ment," however, had been incorporated into the common law as an
186. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
187. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 8.
188. Id.
189. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-96 (Ohio 1984).
190. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
191. Scott v. News-Herald. 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986). The court held the four-factor
test set out in Oilman was the proper test for distinguishing fact from opinion. Id.
192. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
193. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 493 U.S. 1055 (1990).
194. Milkovich. 497 U.S. at 10 (1990).
195. Id. at 11.
196. Id. at 11-13 (citing L. ELDREDGE. LAW OF DEFAMATION 5 (1978): RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 558 (1938): Gertz, 418 U.S. at 370).
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affirmative defense to a defamation action and afforded legal immu-
nity to the expression of opinion on matters of "legitimate public in-
terest."1 97 The Court reasoned this "fair comment" privilege struck a
"balance between the need for vigorous public discourse and the need
to redress injury to citizens wrought by invidious or irresponsible
speech."' 9 18 The Court then considered whether a constitutional "fair
comment" privilege existed for alleged defamatory statements and be-
gan weighing the arguments of the parties. 199
The newspaper, relying upon the dictum of Gertz, argued that the
statements in the newspaper were protected opinion. 200 The Court
disagreed, stating the Gertz dictum was never "intended to create a
wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled
197. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13.
198. Id. at 14.
199. Id. at 14-17. The Court reviewed New York Times, Curtis Publ'g Co.. Bresler. Gertz.
Letter Carriers. Hepps (citing the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff prove the falsity of
the statement against a media defendant). and Falwell.
200. Brief for Respondents, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The existence
of a constitutional opinion privilege was also asserted by the American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio et al. in its Brief of Amici Curiam in support of respondents, which stated at page 36:
Moreover, one of the libel cases often cited as providing some support for a constitu-
tional opinion privilege, Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, [citation omitted], protected the speech of non-media defendants on
the grounds at least undergirdled by the Gertz dictum that 'there is no such thing as a
false idea,' Id. at 284. The epithets in Letter Carriers, which the Court found could not
constitutionally support a libel judgment, were clearly statements of opinion. And no
question was raised as to the applicability of constitutional libel standards under the
New York Times v. Sullivan line of cases.
American Civil Liberties Union Brief of Amici Curiam in Support of Respondents at 36,
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The Amici Brief went on to comment that:
While decided in the context of a labor dispute. it is clear that Letter Carriers, decided
on the same day as Gertz, was premised on constitutional considerations. The Letter
Carriers Court did not rely on the non-constitutional, federal 'pre-emption' approach to
libel in the labor context formulated in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers [citation omitted].
Id. at 36-37.
Another Amici brief, submitted by Dow Jones & Company, Inc. et al., written by Robert D.
Sack in support of Respondents, noted that:
On the day the Court rendered its opinion in Gertz, it also decided Letter Carriers v.
Austin, [citation omitted]. The Court held that the use of vigorous epithets in the con-
text of a labor dispute could not support a defamation judgment, basing its holding, at
least in part, on the Gertz principle that 'there is no such things as a false idea.' The
epithets were opinion, as such unprovable. and therefore non-actionable. Although the
Gertz language when stated was dictum, the Court thus treated it as authoritative on
the same day it was first uttered.
Dow Jones & Co.. Inc. Brief of Amici Curiam in Support of Respondents at 284, Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The Dow Jones brief went on to note that in 1990, every
federal circuit as well as the courts of at least thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
recognized a constitutional opinion privilege based on Gertz. Id. at 13-14 n.14-t5. See also
SACK, supra note 35. at 4-10 - 4-11.
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'opinion.'"201 The Court warned such an interpretation of Gertz ig-
nored the fact that expressions of opinion often imply an assertion of
fact. It explained:
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he implies a
knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an
untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his
assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a
false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of
opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, "In
my opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to reputation
as the statement, "Jones is a liar." 202
The Court ruled no constitutional privilege for opinions was neces-
sary, because the "breathing space" required for freedom of expres-
sion was already secured by existing constitutional doctrine. 20 3 In
situations involving a media defendant, "Hepps ensures that a state-
ment of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitu-
tional protection. ' 20 4 The Court further explained:
[Tihe Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell line of cases provides protec-
tion for statements that cannot "reasonably [be] interpreted as stat-
ing actual facts about an individual." This provides assurance that
public debate will not suffer for lack of "imaginative expression" or
the "rhetorical hyperbole," which has traditionally added much to
the discourse of our Nation.20 5
The Court continued by stating that "[t]he New York Times-Butts-
Gertz culpability requirements further ensure that debate on public
issues remains 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 206 Thus, accord-
ing to the Court, no additional constitutional protection for opinion
was required to ensure freedom of expression.
Having decided there was no constitutional opinion privilege, the
Court examined the statements in the Willoughby News-Herald to de-
termine if they might be non-actionable because they were rhetorical
hyperbole, that is, because no reasonable person would have thought
them to be a literal fact.20 7 The Court reasoned the statements in the
column were not the sort of "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic lan-
201. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
202. Id. at 18-19. The Court explained that "unlike the statement. In my opinion Mayor
Jones is a liar,' the statement, 'In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by
accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin,' would not be actionable." Id.
203. Id. at 19.
204. Id. at 20.
205. Id. (citations omitted).
206. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (citing New York Times. 376 U.S. at 270).
207. Id. at 21.
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guage" that would alert the listener to the fact that the writer was not
seriously accusing Milkovich of perjury. 208 Finally, the Court noted
the accusation of perjury was sufficiently factual to be susceptible of
being proved true or false. 20 9 Thus, the statements in the Willoughby
News-Herald were sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a defama-
tion action and were not protected by any First Amendment privilege.
The Court concluded that its decision balanced its numerous decisions
establishing that First Amendment protection for defendants in defa-
mation cases with the rights of individuals to prevent and redress at-
tacks on their reputations.210
On remand, the Ohio Court of Appeals held the Ohio Constitution
provided no more protection for opinion than the Federal Constitu-
tion, 211 and that Milkovich must only prove that false connotations
were made with the level of fault (i.e., negligence) required by
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 22. Milkovich was not a unanimous decision. In fact, Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion noted that "Diadun not only reveals the facts upon which he is relying but he makes it
clear at which point he runs out of facts and is simply guessing." Id. at 28 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brennan, looking at the context in which the statements were made. noted that they
could not be interpreted as an assertion of fact. Milkovich. 497 U.S. at 28 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). In particular, Justice Brennan pointed to qualifying language used within the article: the
fact that the article clearly indicated it was one man's commentary, not an impartial analysis: and
the location of the article, in an editorial column in a newspaper located in the hometown of the
team that was allegedly mauled at the wrestling meet. Id. at 31-34. Justice Brennan appeared to
be advocating a "totality of the circumstances test" to determine if a statement could reasonably
be interpreted as a factual assertion.
211. Five years after Milkovich, in Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co.. 649 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio
1995), the Ohio Supreme Court limited the effect of Milkovich by recognizing that Ohio's state
constitution provides broader protection than the First Amendment for media commentary.
Similarly, New York courts have also recognized broader protection under the New York Consti-
tution than the minimum required by the federal constitution and have adopted the four-part
test developed in Olman to differentiate between fact and opinion. See Steinhilber v. Alphonse,
501 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1986): Abbot v. Sucich, No. 95 CIV. 5678 (RPP). 1996 WL 453077
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1996); Kovacs v. Briarcliffe Sch., 617 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. 1994): Coliniatis v.
Dimas, 848 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See also Gehl Group v. Koby, 838 F. Supp. 1409. 1416-
17 (D. Colo. 1993) (applying Colorado law, the court held the defendant's charge that Fraternal
Order of Police plaintiffs were "the prostitutes of the law enforcement profession" was pure
opinion, meaning that plaintiff FOP Organizations demeaned the law enforcement profession by
allowing a charitable fund raising organization to profit off of FOP name).
Conversely, other states have failed to recognize broader protection under their state constitu-
tions, even though their constitutions arguably provide broader protection for opinion than the
United States Constitution. See OR. CONSi. art. I, § 8: Hickey v. Settlemleir, 917 P.2d 44 (Or.
Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 920 P.2d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 1996): MICH. CoNs-i. art. I. § 5: Garve-
linck v. Detroit News. 522 N.W.2d 883 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
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Gertz.212 The case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with the opinion. 213
C. The Impact of Milkovich on the Opinion Defense
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court held a separate constitutional
privilege for opinion was not required because the "breathing space"
required for freedom of expression was "adequately served by existing
constitutional doctrine." 214 The Court then set forth two tests for de-
termining whether certain types of speech were protected in a defa-
mation case: the "provable as false" test and the "incapable of
interpretation as actual facts" test.215 It concluded that the Constitu-
tion provides protection for statements of opinion in two situations: if
they address matters of public concern and do not contain a provably
false factual connotation; or if they cannot be "reasonably interpreted
as stating actual facts" about an individual. 216
Although the Supreme Court did not completely abolish constitu-
tional protection for opinion, the initial reaction of lower courts as
well as commentators was that Milkovich narrowed the privilege. 217
However, as courts have continued to interpret and apply Milkovich,
it has become apparent that the case added little to the search for
protected expressions of opinion.218 In part, this was due to the fact
212. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 591 N.E,2d 394, 396 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). The court of ap-
peals, citing Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co, 512 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Ohio 1987), held
that to recover in a private-figure defamation action the plaintiff must prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the defendant failed to act reasonably in attempting to discover the truth
or falsity or defamatory character of the publication. Id.
213. Milkovich and the newspaper settled the case for an undisclosed amount "of more than
$100,000." Mahoney, News-Herald, Coach Settle 16-year-old Libel Suit, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 30,
1991, § 2, at 2. Interestingly, the Maple Heights City School District named a Middle School
after Coach Milkovich not long after his retirement. Ruth Marcus, High Court to Rule on Opin-
ion As Protected Speech; Former Wrestling Coach Pursues 15-year-old Libel Suit Against Ohio
Sports Columnist, THE WASH. Posi. Apr. 29. 1990, § A. at a9.
214. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
215. Id. at 19-20.
216. Id. at 20.
217. For a discussion of the wide divergence among lower courts interpreting Milkovich, see
Robert C. Vanderet et al., Media Law and Defamation Torts: Recent Developments, 27 TORT &
INS. L.J. 333, 340-42 (1992) (listing cases). The authors opined that as a consequence of
Milkovich's narrowing of First Amendment protection, "a larger number of cases ... will go to
trial and be unreviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court in the event of an adverse verdict." Id. at
339. See also Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter Of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 Wm. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 467 (1994).
The initial media reaction to Milkovich was negative. See Hentoff, Editorial. Wrestling with
the First Amendment, THE WASH. POST. June 30. 1990, at a19: Cynthia Fox. How Scary Is
Milkovich? A Matter of Opinion. COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.. May/June 1992, at 19.
218. Some commentators noted the questionable impact of Milkovich immediately after the
opinion. See Nat Stern. Defamation, Epistemology, and the Erosion (But Not Destruction) of the
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that many lower courts, in attempting to apply Milkovich, continued
to use the same tests to distinguish fact from opinion 219 that were used
prior to Milkovich.220
The "incapable of interpretation as actual facts" test in Milkovich
protects statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating
actual facts about a person. 221 The Supreme Court explained that
protecting such statements ensures "public debate will not suffer for
lack of 'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical hyperbole' that has
traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation. ' 222 In sup-
port of its position, the Court relied on Bresler, Letter Carriers, and
Falwell.
Bresler protected the accusation of "blackmail" as "no more than
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered
Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable. ' 223 Letter Car-
riers protected the accusation of "scab" and its definition as "rhetori-
cal hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of contempt" for
those not joining the union. 224  Falwell protected an advertisement
Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REV. 595, 613 (1990) (noting that the Court's shift in terminology
"has neither eliminated the problem nor significantly improved the analysis"): Jerry J. Phillips,
Opinion and Defamation: The Camel in the Tent, 57 TENN. L. REV. 647, 675 (1990) (asserting
that Milkovich "does nothing to clarify the morass of the fact opinion distinction.").
One commentator put a positive interpretation on the decision: "There was, in short, much
less to Milkovich than met the eye; the Court had really made only a cosmetic change in termi-
nology, substituting the age-old dichotomy between 'fact' and 'opinion' with a dichotomy be-
tween 'fact' and 'nonfact."' RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 53 (1992).
219. Although the Milkovich Court reiterated that statements of public concern must be
proven as false before liability under state defamation law occurs, as it previously held in Hepps.
the Court declined to expand the rule to non-media defendants, and thus it is not applicable to
cases involving non-media defendants, such as employers and labor unions. Milkovich, 497 U.S.
at 16.
220. See Sowle, supra note 217 (concluding that there are eight different applications of
Milkovich by the lower courts); M. Eric Eversole, Eight Years After Milkovich: Applying A
Constitutional Privilege For Opinions Under the Wrong Constitution, 31 IND. L. REV. 1107, 1118
(1998) (advocating a more expansive protection under state constitutions).
Further, the Restatement's protection of pure opinion continued to be used by courts after
Milkovich, even though this protection was based on the dicta in Gertz that the Court appeared
to repudiate in Milkovich. See Pope v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 95 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cit. 1996)
(holding that an editorial which disparaged and maligned the plaintiff as an "Ugly American,"
was an expression of opinion); Colodny v. Iverson. Yoakum, Papiano & Hatch. 936 F. Supp. 917,
919. 923 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (attorney's editorial that a book on the Watergate break-in would be
exposed as a fraud was a non-actionable declaration of opinion); Hickey v. Settlemier, 917 P.2d
44. 48 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that statement by neighbor of business that sold animals for
use in medical research, that plaintiff's treatment of the animals was inhuman was a non-actiona-
ble expression of opinion).
221. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
222. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1988)).
223. Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14.
224. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 283-84.
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parody, which depicted Jerry Falwell having drunken sex with his
mother in an outhouse. 225
In determining that the statements at issue in Milkovich were not
rhetorical hyperbole, the Court focused on more than just the words
used. The Court examined the article to determine if there was any-
thing in the "general tenor of the article" to negate the impression
that Milkovich had committed the crime of perjury.226 The Court
noted the statements in the column, were "not the sort of loose, figur-
ative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that
the writer was seriously maintaining [that petitioner] committed the
crime of perjury. ' 227 This analysis resembled the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test originally adopted by the Oilman court and subse-
quently used in labor and employment cases. 228
However, by analyzing words in context to determine if they are
rhetorical hyperbole or actionable facts, it is clear that words, which
may be non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole in some situations, may
be actionable in others. 229 Thus, rhetorical hyperbole is not a deline-
ated class of words, but a class that varies based on the context in
which such statements are made and, as such, requires a case-by-case
analysis to determine if particular statements are non-actionable hy-
perbole or actionable fact. This distinction between non-actionable
rhetorical hyperbole and actionable statements of fact is crucial in the
often heated and emotionally charged areas of labor and employment.
Yet, the variety of approaches taken by courts in attempting to apply
Milkovich to workplace defamation cases underscores the confusion
and uncertainty that continues to exist when courts attempt to distin-
guish between actionable statements of fact and non-actionable rhe-
torical hyperbole.
225. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 48.
226. Id.
227. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
228. See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
229. Letter Carriers. 418 U.S. at 286.
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IV. APPLICATION OF MILKOVICH TO THE OPINION DEFENSE OF
WORKPLACE DEFAMATION ACTIONS
A. Employment Cases
1. "Pure "-Milkovich Analysis
a. Post-Milkovich "Provable as False" Test
Although the Supreme Court specifically limited Milkovich's "prov-
able as false test" to cases involving media defendants, 230 lower courts
have applied Milkovich to workplace defamation cases without con-
fronting that limitation.231 Many of these cases are result oriented,
merely citing the test and concluding the statements were not prova-
ble as false, with little or no analysis. Nevertheless, Milkovich contin-
ues to be cited as the controlling authority for workplace defamation
cases.
In Conkle v. Jeong,232 the plaintiff asked a friend to telephone her
former employer to verify her employment. In response to the call,
the employer stated that the plaintiff was "difficult as an employee"
and "more trouble than [she] was worth. '233 The plaintiff brought
suit, alleging the employer's statements were defamatory. 234 Relying
upon Milkovich, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the
statements were non-actionable opinion because they did not imply a
provably false factual assertion. 235
The court in Sullivan v. Conway236 reached a similar conclusion. In
that case, a former lawyer and business manager for a local union sued
the union and a union official claiming they defamed him by publicly
describing him as "a very poor lawyer. ' 237 The court concluded the
statement was "constitutionally protected opinion" that could not
230. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 n.6.
231. See infra notes 232-248 and accompanying text.
232. 73 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1995).
233. Id. at 917.
234. Id. In addition to liability based upon oral or written statements. employers may also be
held liable for defamation based upon statements made in company e-mail messages. See, e.g.,
Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1995) (vacating summary judgment on em-
ployee's defamation claim where employer informed other employees via e-mail that plaintiff
was fired because she attempted to defraud the company).
235. Conkle, 73 F.d at 917. See also Hinz v. REM-Minn., No. C7-97-1798. 1998 WL 157337
(Ct. App. Minn. Apr. 7, 1998) (plaintiff claimed that a former employer had defamed her when it
informed Minnesota's Board of Social Workers that: 1) she pursued personal relationships with
client to the point of dangerousness: 2) residents got upset when she was around: and 3) she was
a troublemaker. The court held that holding that the statements would not support a defamation
action because they were as "a matter of law subjective, unverifiable opinions and thus, not
actionable.").
236. 959 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Il1. 1997).
237. Id. at 880.
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form the basis of a defamation claim 238 because the statement was
incapable of being proven true or false due to its inherent subjectiv-
ity.239 Although not a true employment case, the Sullivan case exem-
plifies a straightforward Milkovich analysis in a non-media case.
Another case focusing on the subjective nature of employee evalua-
tion is Sliter v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc. 240 In Sliter, the plaintiff
sued his former employer for defamation based upon statements
made in a meeting between the employer and one of its customers in
which he was accused of being a "smart ass, rude and offensive. 24 1
The court observed the term "smart ass" connotes one who is "annoy-
ingly or obnoxiously cocky, knowing, [or] flippant. ' 242 Similarly, the
term "rude" connotes one who is "barbarous or ignorant . . . lacking
refinement, culture or elegance. '243 Reasoning that each person's
own experience would dictate their personal subjective assessment of
such traits, the court held the statements were subjective opinions and
not capable of truth or falsity.
Finally, in Hunt v. University of Minnesota,244 the plaintiff sued for
defamation after her former employer told potential employers she
"had trouble dealing with legislators, . . . lacked warmth, was insin-
cere, and had no sense of integrity. ' 245 Analogizing Milkovich and the
analysis used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in distinguishing be-
tween fact and opinion, which used the four-factor test of Janklow,2 46
the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment in the em-
ployer's favor. The court held the employer's statements were not ac-
tionable because the words could not be proven false.247 It reasoned
that the first two elements of the Janklow test, "specificity" and "ver-
ifiability," were closely related to whether a statement is capable of
being proven false. 248
238. Id. The court based this conclusion on Milkovich and a recent Illinois Supreme Court
decision. The court stated that a "statement is constitutionally protected if it cannot be reasona-
bly interpreted as stating actual facts." Sullivan. 959 F. Supp. at 880 (citing Bryson v. News Am.
Publ'n. 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Il1. 1996)).
239. Sullivan, 959 F. Supp. at 881.
240. No. C-96-Z0044 PVT. 1996 WL 449189 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1995).
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id. at *2.
243. Id.
244. 465 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
245. Id. at 91.
246. Janklow v. Newsweek 788 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the Janklow test.
see supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
247. Hunt, 465 N.W.2d at 94.
248. Id.
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b. Post-Milkovich "Capable of Interpretation as Actual Facts" Test
The Milkovich "capable of interpretation as actual facts" test is de-
rived from the Supreme Court's earlier holdings in Bresler, Letter Car-
riers, and Falwell. As its name implies, this test grants protection to
statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual
facts about a person.
In Bross v. Smith,24 9 the Ohio Court of Appeals employed a
straightforward Milkovich analysis to determine whether a set of let-
ters was actionable. In Bross, a police officer was accused of putting
''rat letters" on department bulletin boards and in police officers'
mailboxes regarding the controversial suspension of the Chief of Po-
lice based on allegations of misconduct.25 0 One letter stated "[a]ny
mother fucker that rats on a cop is no cop. '251 Other "rat letters"
included such statements as a rat was a "doper" or "pill head;" a rat
used "illegal drugs;" rats stole ammunition; and rats were "fucking
each other's wives and girlfriends. '252 The letters went on for almost
a year and a half, calling various individuals and the "rats" collectively
vulgar and profane names, making allegations of wrongdoing, and
threatening to fire and press criminal charges against various
individuals.25 3
On review of a directed verdict granted in favor of the defendants
(the city, the current police chief, and the assistant chief of police), the
Ohio Court of Appeals stated the "rat letters" were the "sort of loose,
figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression
that these individuals [rats] committed these acts." 254 Concluding the
general tenor of the "rat letters" negated any impression the state-
ments are factual assertions, the court held the letters to be within the
realm of protected speech.255
c. Post-Milkovich Totality of the Circumstances Analysis
The vast majority of post-Milkovich workplace defamation cases
viewed the Milkovich test as substantially similar to the totality of the
circumstances, or the four-factor test, set forth in Janklow and Oilman
and used by the federal courts to distinguish fact from opinion before-
249. Bross v. Smith, 608 N.E.2d 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
250. Id. at 1176. Two factions had formed in the police ranks as a result of the Chief's suspen-
sion: the "A team," which supported the suspended Chief; and the "B team," which included
individuals who made the accusations of the Chief's misconduct. Id. at 1176-77.
251. id. at 1177.
252. Id. at 1181.
253. Id. at 1177.
254. Bross. 608 N.E.2d at 1181.
255. Id. at 1182.
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hand.2 56 Some cases view the four-factor test as merely helpful in ap-
plying Milkovich.2 57 Others hold Milkovich merely narrows the
totality of the circumstances, 258 and still others view Milkovich as not
changing the test at all.259 All of these cases generally cite Milkovich
and apply the totality of the circumstances test in one form or another.
In Lund v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co.,260 the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals applied the Janklow four-factor test to deter-
mine whether statements implied actual facts that could be proven
false under Milkovich. The court held a memorandum posted by the
employer with the words "favoritism," "move-ups," "brown nose" and
"shit heads" after the plaintiff's name were constitutionally protected
expressions of opinion and, therefore, were not actionable. 261
Simply because a statement is framed in rhetorical terms does not,
however, make the speaker immune from liability. 262 In Godfrey v.
Perkin-Elmer Corp.,263 a supervisor told his female employee: "Your
job isn't important and doesn't require brains .... You have a bad
attitude. You have a lot of growing up to do. You should learn what
you're doing here. Who do you think you're working for?" 264 The
court noted that New Hampshire constitutional law protects state-
ments of opinion "even when pernicious, pejorative, or harsh," unless
"it may reasonably be understood to imply the existence of a defama-
tory fact as the basis for opinion, ' '265 and Milkovich only strengthened
that protection.266 Nevertheless, the court held the statement about
plaintiff's job requiring no brains could be defamatory because it was
easily susceptible to verification. 267
256. See infra notes 260-281 and accompanying text.
257. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
258. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
259. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
260. 467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
261. Id. at 369. See also Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (deter-
mining, using the Janklow four-factor test. that the statements by a former employer that plain-
tiff "had poisoned the board," was "out of control." "a bad influence." "emotional," and "not a
team player" were not actionable under Milkovich because the statements could not reasonably
be interpreted as stating facts): French v. Eagle Nursing Home. 973 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1997)
(applying a totality of the circumstances analysis, using the four-factor test from Janklow. hold-
ing that a supervisor's statements that plaintiff was a "terrible nurse" and "shouldn't be work-
ing" were opinions which could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts and were
constitutionally protected under Milkovich).
262. See, e.g.. infra notes 263-267 and accompanying text.
263. Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179 (D.N.H. 1992).
264. Id. at 1190.
265. Id. (quoting Nash v. Keene. 498 A.2d 348, 351 (1985)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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California courts have also embraced the "totality of the circum-
stances" test in determining whether statements could be reasonably
interpreted as stating actual facts. In Campanelli v. Regents of Univer-
sity of California,268 a former basketball coach at the University of
California sued the university, its athletic director, and the vice chan-
cellor regarding statements made to The New York Times by the uni-
versity's athletic director after a loss by the basketball team to a rival
school. 269 The athletic director was quoted as stating:
There were things that were unwarranted and inexcusable .... It
was so incredibly bad. I said, "Sheesh, something must be done."
The players were beaten down and in trouble psychologically.
Every other word was a four-letter one. Let me tell you, if I hadn't
made that wrong turn [into the team's locker room], I wouldn't
have known the fix the team was in. 270
Concluding California courts use the "totality of the circumstances
test" to distinguish between fact and opinion, the California Court of
Appeals explained a court must "put itself in the place of an average
reader and decide the natural and probable effect of the state-
ment. '271 The court stressed, "[T]he words themselves must be ex-
amined to see if they have a defamatory meaning, or if the sense and
meaning.., fairly presumed to have been conveyed to those who read
it have a defamatory meaning. Statements cautiously phrased in
terms of apparency are more likely to be opinions. '' 272 Applying this
rationale to the statements made by the athletic director, the court
concluded they could not reasonably be understood to be factual
assertions.
In many post-Milkovich cases applying the totality of the circum-
stances test, the public and social context of the statement are critical
factors in the analysis. 273 Very few of the cases that purport to follow
Milkovich, however, confront the fact that it did not overtly consider
context as part of its analysis. This distinction may be academic, as the
decisions relied upon in Milkovich (e.g., Bresler, Letter Carriers, and
268. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). See also Kimura v. Vandenberg, 281 Cal. Rptr.
691, 699 (1991) (applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis and holding that a budget
director's letter accusing plaintiff of being a "bigot" and a "racist" was protected by the First
Amendment because the general tone of the letter revealed it was not based on implied or
undisclosed factual assertions).
269. Campanelli, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 898.
272. Id. at 897. The court's opinion relied heavily on the charged atmosphere surrounding the
firing of the plaintiff, a former university basketball coach, the highly publicized facts set forth in
the article, and the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole in heated disputes to persuade
others to their positions. Id. at 899-900.
273. See infra notes 274-281 and accompanying text.
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Falwell) considered the immediate and broader social context as part
of the analysis. At least one court has decided the best way to resolve
this apparent conflict is to simply ignore Milkovich and rely on the
Ollman test to determine if statements are constitutionally protected.
In Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. ,274 a former grocery store em-
ployee sued the company based on the disclosure of a written evalua-
tion to a potential employer. The evaluation stated that plaintiff was
"very aggressive to the point of being cocky" and "could be a prob-
lem. '275 The evaluation further provided, "Watch out for the bullshit
.... [The plaintiff] could be dynamite. '2 76
The Illinois Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating the con-
stitutional protection of opinion is rooted in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., citing to the dicta in Gertz, while ignoring the limitations placed
on that dicta by Milkovich.277 The court used the Ollman test to con-
clude the terms "cocky," "con artist," and "bullshit" were not express
statements of fact. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the
nature, content, and context of the statement must be considered
along with the "knowledge and understanding of the audience to
whom the publication was directed. '2 7 8  In particular, the court
pointed out that employment interviews or evaluations "may include
comments which communicate subjective opinions. '279 Applying
Ollman, the court held that because the allegedly defamatory state-
ments [could] not be read to imply facts because they "could be inter-
preted loosely" and were capable of neither proof nor disproof,280
they were constitutionally protected opinions.281 This analysis is remi-
niscent of the fact/opinion dichotomy the Supreme Court attempted
to eliminate in Milkovich.
2. Milkovich Is Only Applicable to Media Defendants
A small number of courts have found that Milkovich only applies to
media defendants. 28 2 There is strong support for the view that the
Milkovich "provable as false test" only applies to statements on mat-
274. 658 N.E.2d 1225 (I1. App. Ct. 1995).
275. Id. at 1228-29. See also Banfield v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., No. 05-96-01425-CV. 1998 Aug
24 1998 519485 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1998) (noting without comment that management's refer-
ence to plaintiffs as "son of a bitching troublemakers" was a constitutionally protected opinion
and not defamatory).
276. Quinn. 658 N.E.2d at 1278-79.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1231.
281. Id.
282. See. e.g., infra notes 286-288 and accompanying text.
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ters of public concern made by media defendants.28 3 The Supreme
Court specifically stated in the Milkovich opinion it reserved judg-
ment on whether that test was applicable to non-media defendants. 284
Thus, after Milkovich, one logical conclusion was that, while the
"provable as false test" is not applicable to non-media defendants, the
"incapable of interpretation as actual facts/rhetorical hyperbole" test
is.285 Amazingly, few courts have made this distinction. Moreover,
cases rejecting Milkovich's application to non-media defendants ap-
pear to reject both Milkovich tests.
For example, in Gant v. Mahoney, Dougherty, Mahoney,286 the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals found Milkovich inapplicable to statements
such as the plaintiff "could not cut it" and he possessed "inadequate
research and writing skills" because Milkovich applied only to cases
involving media defendants or matters involving public interest. 287
Applying the analysis from the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
566, comment b, the court held the statements were not actionable
because they were either true or non-actionable opinions.288
3. Milkovich Completely Eliminated All Constitutional Protection
of Opinions
At least one court has taken the position that Milkovich completely
eliminated all constitutional protection for opinions. In Weissman v.
Sri Lanka Curry House, Inc. ,289 the plaintiff sued her former employer
for defamation after it informed a prospective employer, in response
to a reference request, she was dishonest. The employer argued its
characterization of the plaintiff was opinion and therefore protected
under the First Amendment. 290 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that because Milkovich rejected a separate constitutional privilege for
opinion, and the Supreme Court has not extended constitutional pro-
tection to private speech, private concern and private plaintiff defa-
mation cases must be analyzed under state law principles. 291 Under
those principles, the employer's accusation of dishonesty was held to
be actionable. 292 The Weisman view is clearly in the minority. Indeed,
283. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20.
284. Id. at 19-20 n.6.
285. Id.
286. No. C6-90-571, 1990 WL 105956 (Minn. Ct. App. July 31. 1990).
287. Id. at * 3 n.1.
288. Id. at * 2.
289. 469 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1991).
290. Id. at 472.
291. Id. at 473.
292. Id.
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other Minnesota private plaintiff workplace defamation cases decided
after Weisman have refused to take such a limited view.293
B. Labor Cases After Milkovich
The federal labor law rationale for the protection of opinion or rhe-
torical hyperbole in the workplace was apparently unaffected by
Milkovich. That protection had its genesis in the watershed case of
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
Austin,294 and is based upon federal labor law's policy of encouraging
debate between labor and management, even when the debate in-
cludes intemperate, abusive, and inaccurate statements. 295 Federal la-
bor law's protection of statements made in labor disputes is consistent
with the "rhetorical hyperbole" protection recognized in Milkovich.
Both protect statements that cannot be construed as representations
of fact and promote public debate. However, courts apply the rhetori-
cal hyperbole test far more liberally in the labor context, and gener-
ally with far less analysis.
1. Federal Labor Law Protection for Rhetorical Hyperbole After
Milkovich
In Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, Local 655,296 a grocery store sued a union based upon
picket signs and copies of a handbill distributed by the union during
attempts to organize the store's work force. The handbill, entitled
"ARE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE BALANCED?," stated Food-
land was treating its employees "unfairly" and invited customers to
ask themselves whether the store was "discriminatory" in its hiring
practices. 297 Similarly, the picket signs proclaimed that Foodland was
"unfair" to its black employees.
293. See Hunt v. Univ. of Minn.. 465 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1991): Lund v. Chi. & Northwestern
Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1991).
294. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
295. See supra notes 161-174 and accompanying text.
296. Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 655,
39 F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1994).
297. Id. at 195 n.4. The handbill stated in its entirety:
It is the opinion of an alliance of Beverly Hills citizens that the employees of Beverly
Hills Foodland are being treated unfairly at their jobs.
BEFORE YOU DO YOUR SHOPPING ASK YOURSELF AND BEVERLY HILLS
FOODLAND THESE QUESTIONS ....
1. Is Beverly Hills Foodland being discriminatory in their hiring practices in the com-
munity? For answers to these questions call .... [Foodland's telephone number.]
PLEASE DO NOT SHOP BEVERLY HILLS FOODLAND.
2002]
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Although acknowledging that under Milkovich statements in the
form of opinions "do not enjoy absolute protection as such," the
Eighth Circuit emphasized the "presence of a false statement of fact
[was] a sine qua non for the maintenance of a state defamation action
in the labor field. '298 Due to the fact the handbill did not contain a
false statement of fact, the court held it was not defamatory in the
context of the existing labor dispute. 299 With respect to the picket
signs, the court relied upon Letter Carriers and reasoned the statement
was the sort of "loose language or undefined slogans that are part of
the conventional give and take in our economic and political contro-
versies. ' 300 The court held the term "unfair" was a term requiring
subjective determination and was thus incapable of factual proof.30 1
Although not an issue on appeal, the district court also considered
whether copies of a second handbill distributed by the union were de-
famatory.30 2 That handbill, entitled: "DON'T HELP FEED THE
RAT," stated Foodland was a "RAT EMPLOYER" and it "DE-
SERVED TO BE CALLED A RAT. ' 30 3 The court reasoned the
word "rat" could not be construed as a representation of fact, as no
one reading the handbill would believe the owner of Foodland was
actually a rodent. 30 4 It further stated the term was used in a "loose,
figurative sense" to describe the union's strong opinion of Foodland's
employment practices and, as such, was protected under federal labor
law. 305
Similarly, in Pease v. International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 150,306 the union president was quoted in a local newspaper as
stating that the company owner was "dealing with half a deck .... I
think he's crazy," following the failure of the owner to sign a collective
bargaining agreement.307 The owner sued the union and its president
for slander.30 8 The Illinois Court of Appeals held the statements,
298. Id. at 195. In Shepard v. Courtoise, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1142. 1147 (E.D. Mo. 2000), the court
cited Milkovich and Letter Carriers in concluding that "useless individual." "sarcastic," "cocky,"
and "arrogant" were not actionable, but that "continues to abuse employees" could be a false
assertion of fact and therefore was potentially actionable. Id.
299. Beverly Hills Foodland, 39 F.3d at 196.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Beverly Hills Foodland Inc. v. United Food Workers, 840 F. Supp. 697, 705 (E.D. Mo.
1993).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. (citing Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284).
306. 567 N.E.2d 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
307. Id. at 616. The court held that because the union was attempting to organize the plain-
tiff's construction company, the statements were made during a labor dispute. Id. at 620.
308. Id.
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mere name-calling, were rhetorical hyperbole "employed only in a
loose, figurative sense," and, therefore, were not actionable. 30 9
Even more sinister, severe statements made at a political rally and a
so-called "town hall meeting" were found not to be actionable defa-
mation in Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Trump.310 The Third Circuit af-
firmed dismissal of an action brought by Beverly Enterprises, a
national nursing home chain, and Donald L. Dotson, a company offi-
cial and former Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board,
against Rosemary Trump, President of Local 585 of the Service Em-
ployee International Union.311 A hostile relationship existed between
the company and the union, whose locals represented many Beverly
Enterprise employees. 31 2
Trump encountered Dotson at a 1996 political rally for the Dole/
Kemp presidential campaign.313 Trump accused Dotson of being a
"criminal" and declared "you people at Beverly are all criminals. ' 31 4
Trump refused to listen to Dotson's response, instead charging him
with "devoting [his] entire career to busting unions. ' 315 Finally Trump
shouted at Dotson: "I know your kind. You're just part of that World
War II generation that danced on the graves of Jews. '316
The court found the "union busting" and "criminal" statements
"undoubtedly offensive and distasteful," but "mere insult. '31 7 In
reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit cited Bresler318 and the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, Section 566, but curiously did not cite
Letter Carriers319 or Milkovich.320
The court also found the declaration, "you people at Beverly are all
criminals" to be "reasonably understood as a vigorous and hyperbolic
rebuke, but not a specific allegation of criminal wrongdoing. '321 The
court doubted "union-busting" was a criminal offense, but instead was
"merely a vituperative outburst." 322 Finally, the comment that Dot-
309. Id. at 619.
310. 182 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 1999).
311. Id. at 186.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 187.
315. Id.
316. Trump, 182 F.3d at 187.
317. Id.
318. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
319. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). The district court cited Letter Carriers to support the proposition
that insults, especially in a heated labor dispute, are not capable of a defamatory construction.
Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Trump, I F. Supp. 2d 489, 491 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
320. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
321. Trump, 182 F.3d at 188.
322. Id.
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son was "part of the... generation that danced on the graves of Jews"
was not actionable because it did not amount to slander per se and the
required special damages were not alleged.3 23
The appellate court also analyzed a statement made by Trump at a
"town hall meeting" regarding Dotson's departure from government
service and employment by Beverly Enterprise.3 24 The court found
the statement "incapable of a defamatory construction" and even if
capable not slander per se, requiring allegations of special damages,
which were absent. 325
The rationale developed in labor dispute cases has also been ex-
tended to protect statements made in intra-union conflicts.326 For ex-
323. Id.
324. The following exchange took place between Congressman Ronald Klink and Trump:
CONGRESSMAN KLINK: Thank you. To Ms. Trump and Ms. Ford, just to clear up
in my mind, why have we seen this problem exacerbated so much in Pennsylvania and
we haven't seen it at the other Beverly locations across the country? What transpired
in Pennsylvania to make the situation here much worse?
MS. TRUMP: Well, this is one of the most unionized, heavily unionized Beverly states,
if not the most unionized Beverly state. They operate approximately 42 facilities in
Pennsylvania, 20 of which are organized and we have had a history of bargaining that
went very well. But quite frankly when President Clinton was elected and a new Chair-
man of the National Labor Relations [Board] was appointed, the former Chairman, Don
Dotson, walked out of his federal government job and knocked on evidently the Beverly
door and said, who knows more about all of your unfair labor practice cases in Beverly 1
and 2 than me since I have been supervising them on behalf of the government and
besides which, I could really - really this is conjecture on my part. but I can only as-
sume that because they went out and recruited the former general counsel for the Na-
tional Right to Work Committee. They decided that you're the largest chain of Beverly
facilities, if we're able to break unionism in Beverly chain, then, of course, it will have a
ripple effect in the entire industry and the whole industry will operate nonunion.
Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).
325. Id.
326. For other examples of how the protection for statements made during labor disputes has
been expanded significantly, see Wallulis v. Dymowski and Communications Workers of Am.
Local 7901, 895 P.2d 315 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (union steward, at the request of several employ-
ees, informed Wallulis's supervisor that he was always late to work, took long lunch breaks, was
difficult to reach, and that these issues were affecting the work conditions of other employees:
the court held that the statements occurred during a "labor dispute" and were thus non-actiona-
ble absent a showing of actual malice); Bertsch v. Communications Workers of America, 655
N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that comments in a union newsletter about Bertsch's
inability to tell time or add and her sensitivity "regarding the size of her hind end," were pro-
tected because they were directed to the employee in charge of payroll and arose in the context
of a long running dispute between the company and the union concerning payroll calculation);
and Beverly Hills Foodland, 39 F.3d at 191 (holding that a "labor dispute" existed for the pur-
poses of invoking federal labor law's protection of rhetorical hyperbole, where the local union
was picketing and boycotting a business it had unsuccessfully tried to organize, even though it
had terminated its organizational efforts). But see Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Nat'l Catholic
Reporter Publ'g Co., 978 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (holding that statements published by a
local newspaper concerning layoffs were not protected by federal labor law because Letter Carri-
ers and Linn did not extend protection to third parties "unrelated to a purported labor dis-
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ample, in Wellman v. Fox327 an unsuccessful candidate for a union
position and three of his family members sued the incumbent business
manager along with members of the union's executive board for libel,
based upon statements made in an election flier. 328 The flier alleged
the candidate's father "was thrown off of the Union's executive board
for obtaining funds fraudulently," characterized the candidate's family
as a "gang," and connected the family to a known strikebreaker. 329
The plaintiffs alleged those statements implied they were dishonest,
crooked, and untrustworthy. 330
The Nevada Supreme Court, affirming summary judgment for the
defendants, reasoned that although the statements constituted factual
assertions under Milkovich, they were not actionable because they
were proven to be true.331 With respect to certain secondary state-
ments in the flier (the plaintiffs' actions were a "blemish in our proud
history," and that "the story [plaintiffs] want you to believe and the
truth of the matter are two very different things"), the court appeared
to adopt a Letter Carriers analysis and held such exaggerated state-
ments and overbroad generalizations made in the context of a union
election would be interpreted by a reasonable person as mere rhetori-
cal hyperbole and, thus, were not actionable. 332
The protection of federal labor laws, however, is not without limits.
In San Antonio Community Hospital v. Southern California District
Council of Carpenters,333 the Ninth Circuit held a union banner pro-
claiming that a hospital "full of rats" was not protected labor dispute
rhetoric.334 The hospital sought an injunction against the union, which
was engaged in a dispute with a subcontractor employed by the hospi-
tal, but not with the hospital itself, seeking to enjoin the union from
displaying a banner outside the hospital that stated "THIS MEDI-
CAL FACILITY IS FULL OF RATS." Beneath that statement, in
smaller letters, the banner stated "CARPENTERS L. U. 1506 HAS A
DISPUTE WITH [BEST INT.] FOR FAILING TO PAY PREVAIL-
ING WAGES TO ITS WORKERS. '335
pute."). In Briggs the paper had attempted to argue that its article was non-actionable opinion
and "rhetorical hyperbole in the context of a labor dispute between Briggs & Stratton and its
Milwaukee employees.
327. 825 P.2d 208 (Nev. 1992).
328. Id. at 209.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 211.
332. Id.
333. 125 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 1997).
334. Id. at 1235-37.
335. Id. at 1233.
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The union argued the term "rat" was protected speech in the con-
text of a labor dispute and the banner merely expressed its opinion
that Best Interiors was a "rat contractor" for failing to pay its workers
the prevailing wage. 336 Recognizing federal labor law provides pro-
tection for the use of "intemperate, abusive, or insulting language"
when such "rhetoric" is used to make a point in a labor dispute, the
court cautioned that such protection was not unbridled.3 37 In af-
firming the preliminary injunction for the hospital, the court held the
banner was not rhetorical hyperbole entitled to the protections of Let-
ter Carriers, but "unprotected fraudulent misrepresentations of
fact. 338
Interestingly, the court distinguished the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Beverly Hills Foodland,339 where a union handbill referring to Food-
land as a "rat employer" was held to be protected by federal labor
law. The court reasoned that in Beverly Hills Foodland, no one would
believe the owner of the Foodland was actually a rodent. However, in
San Antonio Community Hospital, many readers would be misled into
believing the hospital was infested with rodents.
The contrasting results of these two cases illustrate the crucial role
that context can play in an analysis. Words that may be held to be
merely loose, figurative language in one context may be actionable in
another if they can reasonably be interpreted as fact.
2. Federal Labor Law Considered as Part of a Totality of the
Circumstances Analysis
Some courts confronted with defamation actions based upon state-
ments made in the course of labor disputes recognize a federal labor
law protection for rhetorical hyperbole, but do so as part of a totality
of the circumstances analysis. These cases generally follow some vari-
ation of the Ollman four-factor test 340 and consider federal labor law
protection as part of the specific context and broader social context
parts of the analysis.
In Henry v. National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists, Inc. ,341 former
union officials brought a defamation action against the union. The
alleged libel included three letters published by the union's board of
directors and disseminated to all 1700 union members during a bitter
336. Id. at 1235.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1237.
339. 39 F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1994).
340. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
341. Henry v. Nat'l Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists. 836 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Md. 1993).
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dispute for union control. 342 One of the letters contained an oft-
quoted statement by Lord Acton of the British Parliament: "Power
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. '343 The plaintiffs
claimed the defendants stated, implicitly and explicitly, that they were
corrupt and incompetent, and they intentionally mismanaged union
affairs and embezzled union funds.344
Although the federal district court in Maryland recognized
Milkovich had abolished any "wholesale defamation exemption for
anything that might be labeled 'opinion,"' it applied pre-Milkovich
law and analyzed the case in terms of the distinction between fact and
opinion 345 using a modified version of the Ollman four-factor test set
out in Potomac Valve & Fitting Co. v. Crawford Fitting Co.346 Under
this analysis, the threshold inquiry is whether the challenged state-
ment can objectively be characterized as true or false. 347 If the state-
ment cannot be so characterized, it is not actionable. If the statement
can be characterized as either true or false, the three remaining
Ollman factors must be considered: the author's choice of words, the
context of the challenged statement within the writing as a whole, and
the broader social context that informs the statement.348 Under the
Fourth Circuit's analysis, if a verifiable statement satisfies any one of
the remaining three Ollman factors such that a reasonable person
would recognize its "weakly substantiated," or "subjective" character,
then the statement qualifies as protected opinion.349
342. Id. at 1206. The letters, written by the union's board of directors, allegedly defamed the
union's Executive Director and the Executive Vice President who were the plaintiffs. Id. The
board wrote and published the letters shortly after the board removed the plaintiffs from their
appointed positions. Id.
343. Id. at 1214.
344. Id. at 1211.
345. Henry. 836 F. Supp. at 1214-15 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18). The court also noted
that under Milkovich, if a statement is not provable as false or is not reasonably interpretable as
stating facts, it cannot form the basis of defamation. Id. at 1214 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-
20). Thus, under Milkovich, only an "objectively verifiable event is actionable." Id. at 1214
(citing Milkovich. 497 U.S. at 22). The court concluded that "although opinions are not abso-
lutely privileged, the basic distinction between fact and opinion appears to have survived
Milkovich." Id. at 1214-15.
346. 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987).
347. Id. at 1288.
348. Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc. Inc.. 866 F.2d 681, 685 (41h Cir. 1989).
349. Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1288. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 862-
63 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 614 (1999) (analyzing the comparison of a union presi-
dent to "Jimmy Hoffa." via a three-part totality of the circumstances test. and citing the Letter
Carriers decision without discussing the impact of labor law).
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The district court in Henry concluded the statements about the cor-
rupting influence of power 350 were merely "loose, figurative, or hyper-
bolic language" that were not subject to objective characterization as
either true or false and thus, not actionable.35 It found the remaining
statements referring to incompetence, mismanagement, and embez-
zlement could be objectively characterized as either true or false, thus
satisfying the Potomac Valve threshold question of verifiability. 352
Upon further examination of the language, specific context, and
broader social context of the statements, the court concluded that the
statements were protected opinions made within the broader social
context of a labor-management dispute. 353
In Smith v. Papp,3 54 the plaintiff, a candidate in an election for
union office, sued a union member for distributing an allegedly de-
famatory campaign flier referring to the plaintiff as "Danny the Com-
pany Man" and "Danny No-Balls," 355 and including statements that
the plaintiff had accepted an all-expense paid trip to Portugal from
management and had secret meetings with management during prior
contract negotiations. 356 In addition, it attributed the following state-
ments to one of the plaintiff's former constituents: "Danny Smith
wouldn't make a pimple on a Union man's ass, but he makes the best
company man any management could hope to have in the Union. '357
350. The statements appeared in two letters, containing almost identical sentences about cor-
ruption. The statements read: "Lord Acton, of the British Parliament two hundred years ago
said, 'Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely!' Perhaps that is what happened
to [plaintiff]" and "There is a saying from the British Parliament that is over two hundred years
old which states: 'Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,' perhaps that is what
happened to both [plaintiffs]." Henry. 836 F. Supp. at 1215.
351. Id. at 1216 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21).
352. Id. at 1217.
353. Id. at 1218-19.
354. 683 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
355. Id. at app. at 391.
356. Id.
357. The Flier read. in its entirety:
WHO THE HELL IS DANNY SMITH?
I've been hearing this question more and more lately, and it deserves an answer.
Since a good number of us worked at the Euclid plant where Smith comes from, we are
fairly familiar with his record:
1) He is the ex-shop chairman who earned 2 (two!) well deserved nicknames during
his less than illustrious career: "Danny the company man" and "Danny no-balls."
2) He is the ex-Union official I heard making a speech to the members one day while
standing next to the plant manager, that went something like this: "You guys better
make more pieces, because the company needs more production to keep your jobs, and
if you don't cut down on your breaks and increase production, you will start getting
some reprimands!"
3) He is the guy who accepted an all expense paid vacation to Portugal to accompany
Euclid plant management. Some said they took Danny along as a boot [sic] licker
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because he fit the role so well, but I'm sure that was just a rumor. At the time, manage-
ment was considering places to transfer the work from Euclid, and visited some "slave"
shops to learn how to squeeze the blood out of people until then, to pay for it. They
needed Danny's assistance to succeed!
4) He is the ex-official who reopened the Local contract about 3-4 months before its
natural expiration in 1990, and when I asked him why, he whimpered like a little
mouse: "Well, the company wanted it, they needed some concessions."
5) He is the ex-shop chairman who led both negotiations for all the concessions dur-
ing the two Local contract talks in 1990, and I was told by some members of his former
negotiating team who were in the know, that he had secret meetings with management
in and out of the plant by himself and behind their back. (sic) Some of the results of his
negotiating abilities:
A. Brought into the plant a Non-Union leather company to set up a crib and to
eliminate the job of material handlers. Gave away the 23 min. breaktime and reduced
it to 12 min.
B. Agreed to prohibit anyone bringing any personal items onto the shop floor, and as
a consequence a man got a D.L.O. for reading his Bible by his machine during his
lunchtime!
6) He is the ex-Union official I heard at the school auditorium during ratification
meeting threaten the membership with the plant closing down if they don't vote for the
concessions he negotiated. These concessions paid the company's expenses of moving
jobs from Euclid to Mexico and Canada. (but Smith was too stupid to see that even
when it was explained to him in detail!)
7) He is the ex-shop chairman who appointed his wife as a committeeman (or
woman) when a vacancy occurred, but wouldn't you know it, she turned out to have
more balls than he did!
8) He is the ex-official whose actions and/or inactions got the working conditions so
outrageously awful, that he couldn't even stand it any longer it seems, so he disap-
peared from the Euclid plant on a Friday, and by the wave of the company's magic
wand, he reappeared in this plant on a Monday. Slick, huh?
9) He is the guy whose qualification as a Union official was best described to me by
one of his former constituents who always tells it like it is, when he said: "Danny Smith
wouldn't make a pimple on a Union man's ass, but he makes the best company man
any management could hope to have in the Union." Amen!!
10) He is also the candidate for Alternate in our Dist. #2, who recently made state-
ments to the effect, that winning this election would assure him first shift, and lot of
overtime. What a piss-poor reason to run for Union office!!!
11) And finally, he is the ex-shop chairman I was warned not to criticize openly or
write anything about (I listen so well!), (because he can't stand criticism and he likes to
file lawsuits so much, he even filed one against his own Union at Euclid!) Of course, he
didn't get anywhere with it, but that's not the point. It seems he's never been informed.
that any idiot can file a lawsuit for anything under the sun. It only takes about $30, but
winning it is a different ballgame. It's also obvious, that he never heard of the Taft-
Hartley Act, or the N.L.R.B. Even a half-baked Union official is familiar with their
laws and rules on Union affairs, elections, campaigns, et. And how about Truman's
advice: "If you can't stand the heat, keep your ass the hell out of the kitchen!" (sic)
12) To be sure, and to be fair, there are many former U.A.W. officers in this plant
from other Locals who served their constituents with competence and distinction.
Danny Smith is just most definitely NOT one of them!!
So, it is your responsibility to yourself to find out about the candidates before the
election, and if you need verification of the above, feel free to call the Euclid Local
(what's left of it) or ask any former Euclid member.
/s/ Ted Papp
Ted Papp, Dept. # 43
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The Ohio Court of Appeals found the defendant's reliance on the fed-
eral Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act misplaced
since the Act applied to a union's reprisal against its members for
their speech, not to a dispute between two members.3 58
Without analyzing the holdings of Milkovich and Letter Carriers, the
court examined whether the flier was protectable opinion under the
Ohio Constitution using a four-part "totality of the circumstances"
test, which considered "the specific language at issue, whether the
statement [was] verifiable, the general context of the statement, and
the broader context in which the statement appeared. '359
Affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court concluded it was
"inconceivable that any reasonable reader would construe the general
context of the information" as anything other than fact. 360 The author
of the flier apparently claimed firsthand knowledge of several state-
ments, and implied firsthand knowledge of others.361 The general
tenor and overall nature of the flier was of factual reporting, not sub-
jective opinion. 362 Thus, the Ohio appellate court found the commu-
nication was not protected opinion.363
3. Milkovich Applied in the Context of a Labor Dispute
One court, under a convoluted fact pattern, found Linn did not ap-
ply to a particular union dispute, applied a straightforward Milkovich
analysis to the controversy, and found a series of statements fell
outside of any protection. In Batson v. Shiflett,364 a bitter dispute
arose between a national union and its local regarding the terms of a
new collective bargaining agreement negotiated at a shipyard. During
the course of the dispute, the national union repudiated the contract
and both the local and the employer filed unfair labor practice
charges.365 When the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled
in favor of the national union and voided the contract, the presidents
Formerly of Euclid
P.S. Wonder why this is printed on yellow? When it comes to standing up for your best
interest, it's the closest match for the streak on Danny Smith's back!!!
Id.
358. Id. at 391. See Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)
(2000).
359. Smith, 683 N.E.2d at 390 (quoting Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 649 N.E.2d 182, 186
(Ohio 1995)).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 391.
363. Id.
364. Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 119t (Md. 1992).
365. Id. at 1196.
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of both the national and local unions began leaf-letting campaigns. 366
The leaflets concerning Shiflett, the local union president, accused
him and his supporters of "crimes of perjury, falsification of records"
and violations of the union's rules.367 The facts of the case were fur-
ther complicated by allegations of unrelated financial improprieties by
Shiflett. 368 Amidst accusations of being a "crook" and a "thief," Shif-
lett lost the next election.369 He brought suit for defamation against
his accusers, and recovered $730,000 in punitive and compensatory
damages.370
With respect to the issue of the viability of the claim of defamation,
the Maryland Court of Appeals interpreted Linn as being a preemp-
tion case. 37' It found Linn did not apply to "the intentional circula-
tion of defamatory materials," and therefore held the case was to be
decided under the New York Times standards. 372 The Court then ap-
plied Milkovich to the question of whether the statements were ex-
pressions of opinion, and concluded they could not be categorized as
"rhetorical hyperbole. '373 It found that since the statements were
"capable of a defamatory meaning," they were actionable. 374 While
arising out of a complex fact pattern, the decision in Shiflett demon-
strated how statements made in an intra-union dispute may avoid ap-
plication of common law, statutory, and constitutional protections.
V. CRITICISM AND MODEST PROPOSALS
The law of defamation functions poorly in the workplace. It is a
patchwork of antiquated and abstract concepts whose effect has only
been softened by the hit or miss application of common law and con-
stitutional defenses. The present law fails to recognize the importance
of communication in the workplace and perversely rewards speakers
who use the inflammatory rhetoric public policy now so strongly
frowned upon. The courts' difficulty in grappling with the distinction
between fact and opinion has only highlighted the law's weaknesses.
366. Id. at 1196-97.
367. Id. at 1196.
368. Id. at 1196-97.
369. Id. at 1197.
370. Batson. 602 A.2d at 1198.
371. Id. at 1204.
372. Id. at 1205.
373. Id. at 1211-12.
374. Id. at 1213.
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A. The Milkovich Analysis Has Proven to be of No Utility
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich, many jurisdic-
tions held a statement of opinion could not be defamatory, thus insu-
lating statements of opinion from liability.375 Dictum in Gertz was
cited as acknowledging a separate constitutional privilege for opinion,
which led to a fact/opinion distinction. 376 The Court in Milkovich de-
clined to create what it described as an "artificial dichotomy" between
opinion and fact. 377 Instead, the Court held that statements of opin-
ion have First Amendment protection only to the extent they have no
provably false factual connotation, regardless of whether they are
qualified as statements of opinion. 378
Theoretically, Milkovich's mechanical analysis should have substan-
tially modified the protection for statements of opinion. It has not.
Most courts that have purported to apply Milkovich have employed
the same tests previously used to distinguish fact from opinion. 379
Lower courts seem unable to abandon public and social context as
critical factors in the analysis, even if the Supreme Court did not con-
sider context as part of its analysis in Milkovich.380 Similarly, many
lower courts apply the Milkovich "provable as false" test to non-me-
dia defendants, even though the Supreme Court reserved judgment on
the test's applicability to cases involving non-media defendants such
as employers and labor unions.38' The Milkovich analysis is of so little
utility that lower courts have paid it only lip service, relying instead on
tests that are themselves only slightly more helpful.
B. The Law of Defamation Disserves Everyone in the Workplace
Communication is essential to the workplace. Supervisors must di-
rect, critique, and redirect employee's performance. Effective man-
agement requires the continual assessment of an employee's strengths
and weaknesses and the communication of those traits to others. Few
businesses could function without the communication of manage-
ment's assessment of job interviews, an employee's performance in
evaluations, and in connection with decisions as to compensation, pro-
375. See supra note 200.
376. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323; see SACK, supra note 35, at 4-10-4-11.
377. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
378. Id.
379. See SACK supra note 35, at 4-18 (stating that "courts now rely on the pre-Milkovich opin-
ion/fact criteria to decide post-Milkovich. what is protected based on whether it is or is not
provably false.").
380. Id.
381. Id. at § 4.2.4.3 at 4-21.
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motions, demotions, discipline, transfers, or in other judgments em-
ployers must make on a daily basis.
Employees and unions also rely on workplace communication. Em-
ployees must respond to management directives and must be free to
express legitimate concerns about those that may be inappropriate. A
union could not exist without the ability to communicate dissatisfac-
tion over management's actions and criticize those of its members
who wish to break ranks.
The law of defamation, developed largely with other contexts in
mind, does not treat workplace communication in a realistic fashion.
The legal concepts that may apply to even the most routine workplace
statements would prove daunting to a trained lawyer, let alone to a
front-line supervisor or middle manager. Phrases such as "opinion,"
"statements of fact," and "malice" have different, and oftentimes
counterintuitive, definitions that would bewilder the vast majority of
supervisors.
The law of defamation also functions badly in the workplace be-
cause it requires fine distinctions unappreciated by laymen. A slight
difference in phraseology or context may subject an otherwise abso-
lutely protected statement to potentially multi-million dollar liability.
Jurisdictions vary widely in the tests they use and in the means by
which they apply even identical tests. 38 2 There are no bright lines and
no clear guidance for those who use the workplace as a forum to in-
sure they may not be held liable for their own words. Of the tests
used, the Olman analysis is probably the most suitable as it considers
the greatest number of factors germane to the running of a modern
business. But even that test fails to take into account the myriad of
other important considerations, rendering it far less predictable and of
far less utility than it otherwise might have.
At the same time, the law displays little sensitivity to the fact that
workplaces themselves vary greatly. The same tests apply without re-
gard to the sophistication of the individual, from a front-line supervi-
sor to the chief executive officer of the company. It recognizes no
difference based upon the supervisor's education, background, or ex-
perience. It applies the same rules to industrial and manufacturing
settings and professional or office environments. The law only
crudely observes how heated a workplace dispute may be. The law,
and the doctrine of opinion in particular, only dimly acknowledge the
critical difference between objective and subjective observations.
382. See supra notes 217-374 and accompanying text.
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Ironically, the current law of opinion and rhetorical hyperbole
serves to punish employers that use objective, even-tempered lan-
guage while rewarding those that use inflammatory and divisive rheto-
ric. Although many courts have stated that a goal of federal labor
policy is to encourage the peaceful resolution of workplace results,3 3
the current law concerning opinion insulates the speaker from liability
if a sufficient amount of invective and rhetoric is used. If an em-
ployer, under today's law, were to state that an employee is a thief, it
may well be subjected to liability.38 4 If, however, the employer sur-
rounds that accusation with name-calling, profanity, and spurious in-
sults, it may not be liable.38 5 The shallow, biting rebuke is favored
over the in-depth, reasoned critique. The courts' current interpreta-
tion of the doctrine of opinion encourages the very type of conduct,
which is most corrosive in the workplace environment.
The courts' most recent interpretations of the protection for opin-
ion also run counter to public policy in other areas. Through sexual
harassment lawsuits and similar legislative and court-related causes of
action, employers have been encouraged to require more civility in
the workplace. 38 6 Certain types of language, particularly those that
insult, or degrade specific groups of people, have been recognized as
being contrary to public policy. 38 7 The current law of defamation, by
contrast, encourages employers to use exaggerated and contemptuous
language in virtually every context. 388 Between the law of defamation
and the law of sexual, or other workplace harassment, employers are
now in the curious position of being better off using caustic, insulting
language, including very personal insults, so long as they do not insult
the employee based upon the employer's gender, race, or other pro-
tected trait.389
The tests applied by the courts have done little to ameliorate the
shortfalls of the law of defamation. The vast majority of the tests ulti-
mately prove hollow, leading the courts to adopt a result-oriented ju-
risprudence and tests that provide no certainty. If an employer, for
example, states it does not "like" an employee, that assessment should
383. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Golf Navigation Co.. 363 U.S. 574.
578 (1960). This policy is also embodied in Section 1 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2002).
384. In fact, such an accusation would constitute slander per se. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7. at § 571.
385. See supra notes 296-374 and accompanying text.
386. See, e.g., Faragher v. Boca Raton. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
387. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.. 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1138 (2000).
388. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
389. Cf Rambo v. Cohen. 587 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding -horse's butt"
merely obnoxious, but "anti-semitic" actionable).
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not lead to any liability. Yet, potentially colorable arguments can be
made that the statement is actionable under virtually any court stan-
dard. For example, one court may find the statement "implies" the
existence of defamatory facts and if the employer did not like the em-
ployee, there must be a reason for it. 39 ° Thus, that court may hold the
statement to be one of "mixed" opinion. Another court may reach
the more sensible conclusion that an employer is free to like or dislike
an employee, and its statement of opinion should not be actionable,
either as "pure opinion," or under the Olman four-part test.391
The doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole creates the paradox that while
false statements may be actionable, extreme vituperative language is
not. It is unclear from the courts' analysis whether rhetorical hyper-
bole is not actionable because it is not provable as false, cannot be
reasonably assumed as fact, or because there is some constitutional
protection. Constitutional protection could have far-reaching
ramifications.392
Even putting aside the inadequacy of the tests applied by the vari-
ous courts, they are simply too unwieldy to provide any real guidance
in the workplace. A typical employer may make dozens, hundreds, or
even thousands of communications regarding its employees on a typi-
cal business day. To subject each of these statements to scrutiny under
one or more multi-part tests is to stifle that language and to discour-
age the employer from evaluating its employees and running its oper-
ations in the most efficient manner. Given the importance of
evaluating employees, improving their performance, and coordinating
business operations, communications about employees should not be
discouraged through cumbersome, unpredictable tests.
While the law of opinion poorly serves employers in the workplace,
it also poorly serves employees and their representatives. The same
uncertainty that afflicts employers also burdens employees.3 93 Em-
390. See supra notes 249-255 and accompanying text.
391. Even then, a determined plaintiff might attempt to argue that the statement was provable
as false (perhaps by showing he is likable, or that the supervisor really did like him, but acted out
of some ulterior motive) or to attack the defense based upon the specific or broader social con-
text. See Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979-83. A whole different set of arguments might be made if the
statement were made during a labor dispute. See supra notes 299-374 and accompanying text.
392. If rhetorical hyperbole is indeed constitutionally protected, that defense could also be-
come available in the most egregious harassment cases involving verbal misconduct. This result,
however, would be a natural product of the Milkovich Court's analysis, finding First Amendment
protection for statements with no provably false factual connotations.
393. The authors of this article agree with Justice Black's dissent in Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 67 (1966), where he argued that the threat of defamation actions
and punitive damages arising out of labor disputes "tosses a monkey wrench into the collective
bargaining machinery Congress set up to try to settle labor disputes." Id.
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ployees who prefer not to take sides in labor disputes have become
ready targets for insults and inflammatory rhetoric from those who
may disagree with them, and who can voice the most pointed, false,
and insulting comments with impunity. Employees who are subjected
to the worst and most insulting language from their employers are left
without a remedy, yet those who receive relatively mild criticism may
find the doors of the courthouse open for recovery.394
Similarly, a union serves a variety of functions, ranging from routine
contract administration (the least contentious), to grievance resolu-
tion (of moderate friction), to organizing drives and strike activity
(where emotions run higher). A very different standard may apply
depending upon the tenor of the relationship with the employer and
the precise function being performed by the union. It is unclear what
standard would apply to a purely intra-union dispute, such as an inter-
nal election, over a matter concerning the union's approach to man-
agement. Defamation claims between unions and their own members
threaten the cohesiveness on which their strength relies.
The continued growth of electronic communications and the In-
ternet will provide every employee, employer, and labor organization
with a far-reaching, and sometimes public, forum to discuss work-re-
lated issues and to vent their feelings.395 This heightened ability to
communicate will further highlight the law's inadequacies. A website
may be a cost-effective means for an employee, or group of employ-
ees, to express dissatisfaction over workplace issues. 396 For many em-
394. See supra notes 214-374 and accompanying text.
395. Employees are using electronic communications for their own amusement and to provide
negative information or statements regarding their employers. See California Judge Orders For-
mer Intel Worker to Stop Mass E-Mailings Critical of Company, INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. REP.
(BNA) Jan. 12, 1999, at 1; Focus on Internet Sites, INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. REP. (BNA) June 29,
1999, at 12; Guernsey, The Web: New Ticket to a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16. 1999, at Dl:
Cohen, Click Here For a Hot Rumor About Your Boss, TIME, Sept. 11, 2000. at 48: Schwartz,
Corporate Case in Ohio Raises Questions on Internet Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at
Cl: Enron Fired Workers for Complaining Online. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at Cl. See also
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating employee was discharged for
sending E-mails containing threats to "kill the back-stabbing bastards" in sales management and
for referring to the company's Christmas party as the "Jim Jones Kool-Aid affair"): You've Got
Inappropriate Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at Cl.
396. For an interesting example of employees using electronic communications to express
their views, see Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000). In that case, a group of
individual Continental pilots created a forum on a computer bulletin board that was critical of a
female Continental pilot who had recovered $250,000.00 from the airline in a sexual harassment
lawsuit over pornography left in the airplane cockpits. The Supreme Court of New Jersey re-
versed and remanded, holding that while employers are not required to monitor their employ-
ees' private communications, employers do have a duty to stop co-employee harassment the
employer knows or has reason to know is taking place in the workplace and "in settings that are
related to the workplace." Id. at 552. See also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 43 P.3d 537 (Cal. App. Ct.
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ployers, e-mail is now an essential component of communication on
workplace issues. The imposition of antiquated legal concepts to this
new technology threatens its tremendous capability to give each
speaker a strong voice and to speed the pace and efficiency of
communication. 397
Certainly, no one would advocate the complete abolition of the law
of defamation, or the imposition of an absolute privilege for any state-
ments that might take place at work. Similarly, statements should not
be protected simply because they might be labeled as opinions by the
speaker. Employees do have a legitimate interest in protecting their
reputations, and protection should exist in those instances in which an
employer manufactures derogatory facts about an employee. As set
forth above, and reflected in the cases decided by the courts, the cur-
rent law of opinion and defamation as a whole does a poor job of
balancing those interests.
C. Steps To Reform the Law of Opinion in the Workplace
1. Changes to the Law of Defamation Generally
To resolve this quandary, or at least to lessen the impact of the
shortcomings, courts should reformulate the protection for opinion on
a common law, rather than a constitutional, basis. First, there should
be no liability for an employer's subjective opinion of an employee's
performance. An employer should be free to state that an employee
is a good employee or a bad employee or whether, in the employer's
judgment, the employee is doing a good or bad job. At a bare mini-
mum, the qualified privilege should apply to any subjective evaluation
of the employee's performance.
Second, to the extent they have not already done so, courts should
adopt the definition of malice found in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
2002) (granting summary judgment for employer in case alleging that disgruntled employee
"spammed" the company with over 180,000 E-mail messages): Cleary. Gottlieb. Steen & Hamil-
ton v. Legal Serv. Staff Ass'n. 837 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (court enjoined campaign by
union to send faxes to law firm containing shaded cartoons that slowed and blurred its fax ma-
chines): Timekeeping Sys.. Inc. v. Leinweber. 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997) (employee who was termi-
nated for sending e-mail to other employees critical of company vacation policy engaged in
protected concerted activity under NLRA); McCarthy. Your Manager's Policy on Employee's E-
Mail May Have a Weak Spot. THE WALL ST. J.. Apr. 25, 2000, at 1. Obviously, some measures
are necessary to regulate the place, manner and content of communications to prevent the dis-
ruption of business and other legitimate activities by inappropriate use of electronic communica-
tions. See, e.g., Wash. Adventist Hosp.. 291 N.L.R.B. 95 (1988) (holding that disruptive use of e-
mail system not protected activity under NLRA),
397. See generally, Gregory V. Mersol. Eniplover/Employee Rights On The Information High-
way - Is There A Right Of Privacy?, CYBERSPACE LAW.. June 1999.
2002]
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van to defeat a qualified privilege.3 98 In most cases in which an em-
ployer has discharged an employee, such as for theft, vandalism,
insubordination, or other serious employee misconduct, it is likely
feelings will run high, and the traditional definition of malice 399 will
prove of limited utility. The New York Times standard, which looks at
the basis for the statement, makes much more sense in this context
since it emphasizes the employer's state of mind and not simply
whether some ill-will may exist between the parties.
Finally, courts should abolish presumed damages. If an employer
has made an unprotected statement damaging an employee's reputa-
tion, the employee should be required to prove what damages oc-
curred. Over the past fifty years, the courts have recognized new
causes of action based on an employee's ability, through expert testi-
mony and otherwise, to prove damages with at least some specific-
ity.4°° While new claims and damages have been recognized,
presumed damages, which rely upon the alleged difficulty in proving
damages, have been left untouched. Courts should abolish the con-
cept of libel per se or slander per se, and the resulting presumed
damages.
2. Modifications Relating to Protection for Opinions
Courts should also consider reorienting the opinion defense to bet-
ter suit the unique needs of the workplace. First, rather than starting
with a "pure" or "mixed" opinion-analysis, courts should take into ac-
count whether the statement is primarily subjective or objective. If
the statement is primarily subjective, it should not be actionable, or at
a very minimum, a qualified privilege should apply.
Second, courts should look at the context in which the statement is
made, a factor already considered to some degree in the Ollman anal-
ysis. Purely intra-corporate communication, such as communication
through the chain of command, should not be considered actionable at
all. Courts should look at the audience and its interest in the em-
ployer's assessment of the employee's performance or conduct.
Third, courts should look to cautionary and other language used by
the employer. Phrases such as "in my opinion," or "I think that"
398. Some courts have already adopted the definition of malice from New York Times. See
Hahn v. Kotten, 331 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio 1975).
399. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9. § 115. at 833-35. See also Barker v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 524 S.E.2d 821 (N.C. App. 2000) (claim of employee discharged for accessing porno-
graphic website allowed to go to trial to resolve malice issues).
400. See, e.g., Sinn v. Burd. 404 A.2d 72 (Pa. 1979): Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Pa.
1974): Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp.. 606 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
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should be given weight in determining whether, in fact, a statement is
one of fact or opinion.40 Under the current state of the law, the
speaker is rewarded by brashly making conclusions in colorful, caustic,
and derogatory terms.40 2 By focusing on the cautionary language,
courts could more profitably look to conduct that public policy should
promote. An employer that quietly posits its opinion, and labels it as
such, should be given greater protection than the proverbial loose
cannon.
Fourth, courts should look to the environment in which the state-
ment is being made.40 3 Instead of looking to the use of rhetorical hy-
perbole, however, courts should focus upon whether, in a particular
situation, there is competition for ideas. Labor disputes, for all of
their impolitic language, ultimately come down to a competition for
ideas. Similarly, in the context of advocacy or debate within an em-
ployment setting, words and thoughts should be given greater protec-
tion. That protection should not turn upon the strength of the
language used, but rather, upon whether, in that context, one party
has an opportunity to state its beliefs, even if less effectively, in an
effort to persuade others.
Finally, courts should look to whether the employee has a voice in
the context. An employee who is actively seeking elected union of-
fice, and has thrust himself into the fray of campaign debate, should
be given less protection than one who quietly does her job. Similarly,
an employee attempting to gain the support of others in dispute with
an employer should not be able to claim defamation if the employer
responds.
3. Legislative Solutions
From a legislative standpoint, another limited alternative should be
to create a set means by which an employer can state the reason for
the employee's discharge coupled with the employee's response. Ide-
ally, liability for statements made in such a context should be tightly
proscribed with the employer and employee largely free to state their
beliefs as to the reasons for the employee's discharge. While some
legislatures have attempted to adopt service letter provisions. 40 4 those
40l. While cautionary language should be given weight, its mere use by itself should not be
dispositive.
402. See supra notes 294-374 and accompanying text.
403. This is a different facet of the third and fourth elements of the Oinan test. which looked
at the immediate and broader social context. Olman, 750 F.2d at 979-83.
404. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.140 (2001): IND. CODE § 22-6-3-1 (2002): OKLA. STAT.
TIT. 40. § 171 (2002) (applying only to certain employers).
2002]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
statutes do not go sufficiently far; failing to insulate the employer for
derogatory opinions which it believes to be true, yet providing the em-
ployee with little opportunity to formally voice his or her own
position.
VI. CONCLUSION
The existing protection for opinion, and the law of defamation as a
whole, function poorly in the workplace, encourage conduct contrary
to public policy, and lack the predictability, which employers, employ-
ees, and unions should rightfully expect. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Milkovich has clouded the analysis, and added nothing of
significance to workplace defamation law. The sheer cost of defama-
tion suits to employers, unions, and employees and the need to im-
prove workplace communication militate strongly toward providing
greater certainty and protection in that context. Therefore, courts
should modify the law of opinion to provide more predictable and
more consistent results, and to reward civil discourse over wild-eyed
rhetoric.
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